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1  See:  Funk-Zweikampf Formula 
2  See:  Evolutionary Stable Strategy 
3  See  Island Survival Game ; Earth Island Survival Game 
4  Original material, theoretical description, artwork, commentary & personal correspondence. 
5 Funk Island..., 60 km east of Fogo Island off the northeast coast of Newfoundland, is home to more than one 
million common murres, numbers that make it the largest colony of common murre in the western North 
Atlantic.... 
      As a seabird ecological reserve, Funk Island is now known for its ability to protect seabirds.  This was not always 
the case.  In previous centuries, Funk Island was one of the major nesting areas of the Great auk, and people came 
regularly to hunt the birds and take their eggs....  The Great auk—large, flightless birds—were eventually hunted 
to extinction. 
      This loss shows how human activity can result in the extermination of… species.  Making Funk Island an ecological 
reserve has helped other… species recover from similar exploitation and near extirpation.... 
      At 5.2 km2 (5 km2 of which is the marine component), the reserve is the smallest seabird ecological reserve in 
Newfoundland and Labrador, but it's also one of the most important (FI 2008). 
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TOUCHSTONE1 
 
 
 
 
[Problem:]  Economic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumptions. Economists in 
building up a theory have often omitted to examine the foundations on which it was erected.  This examination is, however, 
essential not only to prevent the misunderstanding and needless controversy which arise from a lack of knowledge of the 
assumptions on which a theory is based, but also because of the extreme importance for economics of good judgement in 
choosing between rival sets of assumptions.2 
 
[Solution:]  In… economics the most fruitful work may be that of careful, patient description; indeed this may be by far 
the largest domain for the present and some time to come…. 
    Economic problems [have been and are often] not formulated clearly and are often stated in such vague terms as to make 
mathematical treatment a priori appear hopeless because it is quite uncertain what the problems really are.  There is no 
point in using exact methods where there is no clarity in the concepts and issues to which they are to be applied.  
Consequently the initial task is to clarify the knowledge of the matter by further careful descriptive work.3 
                                                 
1 Every man carries about him a touchstone... to distinguish... truth from appearances [Locke 1706, as cited in 
Popper 1963, p 3]. 
2  Coase 1930, p 386 
3  Von Neumann & Mogenstern 1944, pp 2-4 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Academic Prostitution 
Survival in academia depends on publications in refereed journals. Authors only get their papers 
accepted if they intellectually prostitute themselves by slavishly following the demands made by 
anonymous referees without property rights on the journals they advise. Intellectual prostitution is 
neither beneficial to suppliers nor consumers. But it is avoidable. The editor (with property rights 
on the journal) should make the basic decision of whether a paper is worth publishing or not. The 
referees only give suggestions on how to improve the paper. The author may disregard this advice. 
This reduces intellectual prostitution and produces more original publications.1 
 
Applied Mathematics 
(a) The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by 
the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently 
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of 
society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate "given" resources-if "given' is taken to mean 
given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these "data." It is rather a 
problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for 
ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of 
the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality. This character of the fundamental 
problem has, I am afraid, been rather obscured than illuminated by many of the recent refinements of economic 
theory, particularly by many of the uses made of mathematics.2 
 (b) What has gone wrong with the development of economics as a science? Answer: There was a 
bunch of intelligent people who felt compelled to use mathematics just to tell themselves that they 
were rigorous in their thinking, that theirs was a science. Someone in a great rush decided to 
introduce mathematical modelling techniques…without considering the fact that either the class of 
mathematics they were using was too restrictive for the class of problems they were dealing with, 
or that perhaps they should be aware that the precision of the language of mathematics could lead 
people to believe that they had solutions when in fact they had none.3 
(d) We may also observe that part of the feeling of dissatisfaction with the mathematical treatment 
of economic theory derives largely from the fact that frequently one is offered not proofs but mere 
assertions which are really no better than the same assertions given in literary form.  Very 
frequently the proofs are lacking because a mathematical treatment has been attempted of fields 
which are so vast and so complicated that for a long time to come… there is hardly any reason at all 
to expect progress more mathematico.4 
(e) Mathematicians may flatter themselves that they possess new ideas which mere human language 
is as yet unable to express.  Let them make the effort to express these ideas in appropriate words 
without the aid of symbols, and if they succeed, they will not only lay us laymen under a lasting 
obligation, but, we venture to say, they will find themselves very much enlightened during the 
process, and will even be doubtful whether the ideas as expressed in symbols had ever quite found 
their way out of the equations into their minds.5 
(f) Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform 
without thinking about them.  This is of profound significance in the social field. We make constant 
use of formulas, symbols, and rules whose meaning we do not understand and through the use of 
which we avail ourselves of the assistance of knowledge which individually we do not possess. We 
have developed these practices and institutions by building upon habits and institutions which have 
                                                 
1  Frey 2002, abstract 
2  Italics mine, Hayek 1956, pp 519-520 
3  Taleb 2001, p 177 
4  Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, p 5 
5  Maxwell 1873, p 400 
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proved successful in their own sphere and which have in turn become the foundation of the 
civilization we have built up.1 
(g) It is an interesting speculation to think what direction the development of Menger’s thought 
would have taken if he had been acquainted with these founders of mathematical analysis. It is a 
curious fact that, so far as I am aware, he has nowhere commented on the value of mathematics as a 
tool of economic analysis. There is no reason to assume that he lacked either the technical 
equipment or the inclination. On the contrary, his interest in the natural sciences is beyond doubt, 
and a strong bias in favour of their methods is evident throughout his work….He does not even 
refer to the mathematical method in any of his writings on methodology…Must we conclude that 
he felt rather sceptical about its usefulness?2 
(h) In… Principles, Marshall confined his use of diagrams and other mathematical notations to 
footnotes and appendixes so as not to allow his mathematics to detract from his economics.  He was 
interested above all in plain communication—with businessmen as well as with students.  
Moreover, he was acutely aware that over reliance on mathematics “might lead us astray in pursuit 
of intellectual toys, imaginary problems not conforming to the conditions of real life: and, further, 
might distort our sense of proportion by causing us to neglect factors that could not easily be 
worked up in the mathematic machine” (Ekelund & Hebert 1997, p 341). 
 
Aristotelian Method 
The development of thought since Aristotle could, I think, be summed up by saying that every 
discipline, as long as it used the Aristotelian method of definition, has remained arrested in a state of 
empty verbiage and barren scholasticism, and that the degree to which the various sciences have 
been able to make any progress depended on the degree to which they have been able to get rid of 
this essentialist method. (this is why so much of our ‘social science’ still belongs to the Middle 
Ages.) This discussion of this method will have to be a little abstract, owing to the fact that the 
problem has been so thoroughly muddled by Plato and Aristotle, whose influence has given rise to 
such deep-rooted prejudices that the prospect of dispelling them does not seem very bright.3 
 
Art of Denunciation 
One of the most important elements of success in becoming a man of genius is to learn the art of 
denunciation. You must always denounce in such a way that your reader thinks that it is the other 
fellow who is being denounced and not himself; in that case he will be impressed by your noble 
scorn, whereas if he thinks that it is himself that you are denouncing, he will consider that you are 
guilty of ill-bred peevishness. Carlyle remarked: “The population of England is twenty millions, 
mostly fools.” Everybody who read this considered himself one of the exceptions, and therefore 
enjoyed the remark. You must not denounce well-defined classes, such as persons with more than a 
certain income, inhabitants of a certain area, or believers in some definite creed; for if you do this, 
some readers will know that your invective is directed against them. You must denounce persons 
whose emotions are atrophied, persons to whom only plodding study can reveal the truth, for we 
all know that these are other people, and we shall therefore view with sympathy your powerful 
diagnosis of the evils of the age.4 
 
Asteroids 
(a) The Earth has a long and violent history of collisions with extraterrestrial bodies such as 
asteroids and comet nuclei. Several of these impacts have been large enough to produce major 
environmental changes, causing mass extinctions and severe alterations to weather patterns and 
geography. There is no reason to suppose that the likelihood of such collisions will be any less in the 
future and the spread of human settlement, civilisation, and particularly urbanisation, makes it 
                                                 
1  Hayek 1945, pp 519-530 
2  Menger & Hayek 1871, p 15 
3  Popper 1945, Vol. II, p 9 
4  Russell 1932 
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much more likely that a future impact, even relatively small, could result in the massive loss of 
human life and property. Despite the fact that the technology exists to predict and to some extent 
prevent such events, there is currently no co-ordinated international response to this threat.1 
(b) It is widely believed that meteorites originate in the asteroid belt, but the precise dynamical 
mechanism whereby material is transported to Earth has eluded discovery.  The observational data 
for the ordinary chondrites, the most common meteorites, impose severe constraints on any 
proposed mechanism.  The ordinary chondrites are not strongly shocked, their cosmic ray exposure 
ages are typically <20 Myr, their radiants are concentrated near the antapex of Earth's motion and 
they show a pronounced 'afternoon excess' (for every meteorite which falls in the morning two fall 
in the afternoon).  Wetherill concluded that these data could only be explained by an "unobserved 
source" of material...  His subsequent, more sophisticated investigations have not changed this basic 
conclusion…. Since asteroidal debris is quite easily injected into this chaotic zone, it could provide 
Wetherill's 'unobserved source' if chaotic trajectories which begin at asteroidal eccentricities 
(e<0.2) reach such large eccentricities that Earth's orbit is crossed (e>0.57)... At least some of 
these chaotic trajectories do have the properties required to transport meteoritic material from the 
asteroid belt to Earth. Combined with the Monte Carlo calculations which show that the resulting 
meteorites are consistent with all the observational constraints, the case for this chaotic route to Earth is 
fairly strong.2 
(b) The greatest natural threat to the long-term survivability of mankind is an asteroid or comet 
impact with the Earth. SHIELD is an architectural concept for a comprehensive Earth defense 
system designed to discover, catalogue, calculate orbits of near-Earth objects, and to deflect 
potential impactors. SHIELD consists of Sentries, Soldiers, and an Earth Control Center. Sentries 
are spacecraft designed to search and locate NEOs of all types. Sentries maximize the lead-time for 
a potential impact, which simplifies the task of the Soldiers to deflect the object. Sentry spacecraft 
determine the orbit of each object, and compare it with the onboard database of known NEOs. The 
results are kept in a distributed space-Earth database. Soldier spacecraft deflect or disperse the 
potential impactor. Several mitigation methods have been compared by their specific impulse. Each 
technique requires some development to be feasible. These techniques can be categorized into 
“rendezvous” in which the Soldier physically lands on the NEO and “intercept”. The required 
number of Soldiers and their locations has been examined. SHIELD has clearly shown that an Earth-
protection system is practical and that a full system could be built within a few years. Indeed, very 
capable Sentries can be launched today.3 
 
Asteroid Tugboat 
An Asteroid Tugboat… is a fully controlled asteroid deflection concept using a robotic spacecraft 
powered by a high efficiency, electric propulsion system (ion or plasma) which docks with and 
attaches to the asteroid, conducts preliminary operations, and then thrusts continuously parallel to 
the asteroid velocity vector until the desired velocity change is achieved.  Based on early warning, 
provided by ground tracking and orbit prediction, it would be deployed a decade or more prior to a 
potential impact.4 
 
Austrian Economics 
What Mises taught us in his writings, in his lectures, in his seminars, and in perhaps everything he 
said, was that economics—yes, and I mean sound economics, Austrian economics—is primordially, 
crucially important. Economics is not an intellectual game.  Economics is deadly serious.  The very 
future of mankind—of civilization—depends, in Mises’ view, upon widespread understanding of, 
and respect for, the principles of economics.  
     This is a lesson, which is located almost entirely outside economics proper.  But all Mises’ work 
                                                 
1 Tate 2006, abstract 
2 Italics mine, Wisdom 1985, abstract 
3  Gold 2001, abstract 
4  Schweickart et. al., 2003, abstract 
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depended ultimately upon this tenet.  Almost invariably, a scientist is motivated by values not 
strictly part of the science itself.  The lust for fame, for material rewards—even the pure love of 
truth—these goals may possibly be fulfilled by scientific success, but are themselves not identified 
by science as worthwhile goals. What drove Mises, what accounted for his passionate dedication, his 
ability calmly to ignore the sneers of, and the isolation imposed by, academic contemporaries, was 
his conviction that the survival of mankind depends on the development and dissemination of 
Austrian economics.  
     Austrian economics is not simply a matter of intellectual problem solving, like a challenging 
crossword puzzle, but literally a matter of the life or death of the human race.1 
 
Axiom 
  (a) “Fundamental Ideas”... are the sources of necessary truths (sometimes called “Axioms”).2  
(b) The choice of axioms is not a purely objective task.  It is usually expected to achieve some 
definite aim – some specific theorem or theorems are to be derivable from the axioms – and to this 
extent the problem is exact and objective.  But beyond this there are always other important 
desiderata of a less exact nature:  The axioms should not be too numerous, their system is to be as 
simple and transparent as possible, and each axiom should have an immediate intuitive meaning by 
which its appropriateness may be judged directly…. (to strike a proper balance is a matter of 
practical – and to some extent even esthetic – judgement).  In a situation like ours this last 
requirement is particularly vital, in spite of its vagueness:  we want to make an intuitive concept 
amenable to mathematical treatment and to see as clearly as possible what hypotheses this requires.3   
 
Byr  Billion Years 
 
Biogeography 
(a) Biogeography is the study of the distribution and patterns of distribution of plants, animals and 
other organisms across the globe, on land, in the sea and in the air.4 
(b) The study of the facts and the patterns of species distribution. It's the science concerned with 
where animals are, where plants are, and where they are not. On the island of Madagascar, for 
instance, there once lived an ostrichlike creature that stood ten feet tall, weighed half a ton, it 
thumped across the landscape on a pair of elephantine legs. Yes, it was a bird. One thousand pounds 
of bone, flesh, feathers. This 1s no hypothetical monster, no implausible fantasy of Herodotus or 
Marco Polo. h a ramshackle museum in Antananarivo, I've seen its skeleton; I've seen its two-gallon 
egg, Palaeontologists know it as Aepyomzs maximus. The species summed until Europeans reached 
Madagascar m the sixteenth century and began hunting it, harrying it, transforming the ecosystem a 
was part of, scrambling those bounteous eggs. A millennium ago, Aepyomzs maxzmus existed only on 
that single island; now it exists nowhere.  To say so is the business of biogeography.  As practiced 
by thoughtful scientists, biogeography does more than ask Which species? and To Where? It also asks 
Why? and, what is sometimes even more crucial, Why not?5 
(c) Godfrey Baldacchino wrote: 
     I should be there on Monday... but, if you wish, I can arrange something more 'formal' - with an 
invitation issued to all members of the Faculty... Even later on during next week - say, Thursday, 2 
to 3.30pm - so we don't have to listen to two presentations back to back... 
     I have asked Matt to consider a presentation comparing development policy in Barbados and 
Mustique... 
     Some more good news: we may have a MAIS grad course in island biogeography on offer as 
from next September. Courtesy of Dr Marina Silva (Dept of Biology). 
                                                 
1  Kirzner 2006 
2 Whewell 1837, reprinted in Butts 1968, p 5 
3  Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, p 25 
4 Spellerberg & Sawyer 1999, p xi. 
5 Quammen 1996, p 2. 
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Matt Funk wrote: 
     A formal invite to the department would be great; I'd be happy to deliver a Barbados/ 
Mustique/Sustainable Economic Development seminar.... 
     Very exciting news about the Biogeograpical course offering, by the way, as the more I read 
about this conceptual tool, the more I understand the basis for Bowman's1 conjecture: “Since 
biogeography holds the key to the survival of life, it deserves more attention.”  But I also believe his 
conjecture is ultimately incorrect, since I have also become more acutely aware that ‘Biogeography’ 
does not exist.  And it is in fact unfortunate that there are many who mistakenly believe that it (and 
every other subject matter) exists. I'm sure you will all recall my emphasis on Popper's contention 
that subject matters do not exist;2 please consider this notion yet again in this light: 
 
“It is easy to call for interdisciplinary syntheses, but will anyone respond? 
Scientists know how to train the young in narrowly focused work; but how do you 
teach people to stitch together established specialities that perhaps should not 
have been separated in the first place? Early in this century the specialities of 
biology and chemistry were joined to form biochemistry; similarly, economics and 
ecology are now in the process of being combined into ecological economics. 
My first attempt at interdisciplinary analysis led to an essay, "The Tragedy of 
the Commons." Since it first appeared in Science 25 years ago, it has been 
included in anthologies on ecology, environmentalism, health care, economics, 
population studies, law, political science, philosophy, ethics, geography, 
psychology, and sociology. It became required reading for a generation of students and teachers seeking to meld 
multiple disciplines in order to come up with better ways to live in balance with the environment. 
I did not start out intending to forge an interdisciplinary link, but rather to present a retiring president's address 
to the Pacific division of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. But even after six revisions, 
each quite different from the one before, my summary of an ecologist's view of the human overpopulation 
problem would not crystallize. Repeatedly, I found fault with my own conclusions.”3 
     The reason I say that it is unfortunate that "Biogeography" exists, is because its methods are 
absolutely essential to understanding “island studies,” and it is very easy to see how many scholars 
may never dig into this “specialty”.  It is rather ironic that Spellerberg & Sawyer's4 An Introduction to 
Applied Biogeography (the best introduction I have been able to discover) reaches the same conclusion 
(Indeed, it seems rather lucky that I stumbled  into it.  I've attached Hardin 1998 (which contains 
the citation above) and Hardin 1968. 
     Again, there are only problems, and our urge to solve them.  If we must insist on subject matters, there 
is only one subject and it is called ‘Nature’ or perhaps ‘Biology,’ and all other problems fit into 
these laws, as even art and even the laws of physics must be held within the biological realm, since 
biological organisms form, evaluate, and utilize both the laws of physics and works of art. 
Remember, Darwin was not a ‘evolutionary biologist’ or even a ‘biologist,’ he was a Naturalist.  
One of the most influential books he read while onboard The Beagle was a work by a so-called 
economist (Malthus, whom also happened to influence Lloyd, of which more to follow), and don’t 
forget that he borrowed the concept of the survival of the fittest from Adam Smith, not the other 
way around.  How many ‘economists’ today take time to seek out relevant works in ‘evolutionary 
biology’?  How many biologist read economics? True, the answer to both questions is “far more 
than ten years ago,” but, as Hardin noted above (and Popper insisted everwhere), perhaps these 
‘subjects’ should not have been separated in the first place.  I will also suggest that it is no coincidence 
that, although ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ is cited by economists more often than any other 
‘specialist,’ (Hardin 1968 is also the single-most cited article in so-called ‘ecological economics’) 
                                                 
1  1994. 
2  See: Scientific Method 
3  Hardin 1998.  Also see:  Tragedy of the Commons 
4  1999 
On the Problem of  Vague Terms:  A Glossary of Clearly Stated Assumptions & Careful, Patient Descriptions        
 
page 9 of 63 
and that Hardin was a biologist. 
     Another important element I will briefly share is this:  If a scholar does not completely 
understand and accept the fundamentals of what we refer to as evolutionary biology, very close to 
nothing else will be understood, and his or her analysis is likely to demonstrate this deficit.  I 
believe it may be unfortunate that one may be conferred with a PhD in ‘Economics’ (and every 
other social science, for that matter) without first (or concurrently) producing a PhD thesis in 
Biology (and preferably evolutionary biology,1 or perhaps at the very least, something like 
‘evolutionary game theory’),2 as I have discovered that economics without evolutionary biology is about as 
effective as letters without a language.  The famous evolutionary geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky 
remarked that, “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution,”3 but – perhaps as 
an ‘evolutionary geneticist’ – he was only able to see the tip of the iceberg, because  nothing on Earth 
makes sense except in the light of evolution!   
     I would like you all to carefully consider the six pages which make up Hardin 1968:  I submit 
that if, for example, we had (1) read and discussed these six pages, and (2) agreed to accept the 
central thesis, (which I realize may not have occurred) then (3) we would have systematically 
provided solutions for very close to 100% of the problems which we had grappled with many – if 
not most – of our seminars for the past year.  Yes, it is true that one may endeavour to formulate 
arguments based upon what amount to, essentially, religious grounds (such as a belief in the 
redistribution of wealth and so-called ‘inalienable, global human’ rights – of course just who or how 
the wealth is to be redistributed and how these ‘global’ rights are to be insured is another story), 
but the burden of proof will be heavy on their hands, as the empirical evidence in favour of 
evolutionary biology outweights the empirical evidence demonstrating the existence of god/s. 
     If you decide to accept and utilize the arguments I'm submitting, and should find yourself 
criticized for being a ‘Social Darwinist’ kindly thank your critic for essentially calling you a 
‘naturalist,’ because what he or she has unwittingly stated is that your argements are logical, sound, 
rational, and founded upon fact, not fiction.  You might also want to remark that, since Adam Smith 
had formulated ‘Darwinism’ in 1776 (On the Wealth of Nations), if there was any name-calling to 
done along these lines, it is to call Darwin a “Natural Smithian,” or, to go with the title of his book 
instead, a “Natural  Wealthiest!”      
     Finally, please consider [the ABSTRACT], for I have found that the deep roots of religion and 
‘social norms’ may combine to make nothing more difficult than to always bear [it] in mind… 
And please do consider this carefully, for in this light you will find cooperative behaviour, kin selection, 
reciprocity, etc, but you will not find social justice.  For, once again, who do you propose would 
administer this ‘social justice’?  The wise owl?  The noble lion?  Ah, but some will say, ‘but we are 
different!’  Somehow, one single species on Earth (humans) is different than all of the rest.  Well, 
I'm afraid, once again, the burden of proof in this argument is, once again, on their hands,4 for, 
again, the argument is essentially religious/irrational.5  When Nietzsche said "God is dead," what 
he was trying to say was God will not protect your nest, God will not collect insects for you, 
money does not grow on trees, etc. - you must fight for survival (including your family's survival, 
                                                 
1 (a) Among the things that science does know, evolution is about as certain as anything we know (Dawkins 2004). 
 (b) The two basic questions in evolutionary biology are (1) how does evolution occur and (2) why does evolution 
occur?  The first is a question of mechanisms and the second is a question of influences on those mechanisms (Grant 
1998, p 1). 
2 See Cressman 1996, Kolstad 2007, Sigmund & Nowak 1999, Stumpf 2001, Vincent 1996, and many excellent 
works by Weibull. 
3 Wilson 2006, p 1479. 
4 I am aware that the conclusions arrived at in this work will be denounced by some as highly irreligious; but he who 
denounces them is bound to shew why it is more irreligious to explain the origin of man as a distinct species by 
descent from some lower form, through the laws of variation and natural selection, than to explain the birth of the 
individual through the laws of ordinary reproduction (Darwin 1883, p 1242). 
5 Those whom we called brutes had their revenge when Darwin shewed us that they are our cousins (Shaw 1903, ln 
129). 
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your community's survival, your nation's survival, etc.).  For those not fortunate enough to have 
studied the ‘subject’ of ‘evolutionary biology’, the inalienable survival instinct is known and 
universally accepted (with the exception of those whom failed in this course of study) as The Ground 
Zero Premise,1 which, even Bertrand Russell, perhaps the greatest logician of the past century, was 
not able to fully grasp.2 And yes, more organisms will perish than will survive (and this holds true 
for every species, including ants, bees, birds, humans, hogs, fish, dragonflies, etc.).  
I would also like to suggest that Tragedy of the Commons serve as a required text for the Introduction 
to Island Studies course, as this phrase serves as useful shorthand when it is fully understood, and 
may help accelerate the learning process when it comes to understanding islands, and thus, 
understanding the world in which we live. 
     I Hope you all find this more interesting than tedious; I'm interested and open to any comments 
and criticisms you may have to offer (including comments or criticisms from Dr Silva and/or other 
members of our biology department!).  I've also CC'd Faiz since I value his criticism and suspect he 
may strongly disagree; if someone is brave enough to forward to Ariana (I do not have her email), I 
suspect she may disagree even more adamantly... 
Hope to see you all on Monday...Matt 
PS:  I have attached a third Hardin paper (1974) which may also brew interesting discussions over 
coffee, as well as an excellent PNAS paper(which I have found to be the single best source for my 
research purposes) from last week, which, I believe demonstrates how relevant Hardin is yet today.  
Note the first citation in this PNAS paper is Hardin 1968.  I will also add that this citation is 
incorrect, or, at the very least, inadequate, since Hardin did not in fact first formulate "The Tragedy 
of the Commons." - Hardin's work was based upon a much earlier finding by Oxford economist, 
WF Lloyd (1833), whose work I have also attached; Lloyd's promethean vision was extraordinary.3 
 
Bullshit 
(a) One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit. Everyone knows 
this. Each of us contributes his share. But we tend to take the situation for granted. Most people are 
rather confident of their ability to recognize bullshit and to avoid being taken in by it. So the 
phenomenon has not aroused much deliberate concern, nor attracted much sustained inquiry. In 
consequence, we have no clear understanding of what bullshit is, why there is so much of it, or 
what functions it serves.  And we lack a conscientiously developed appreciation of what it means to 
us.  In other words, we have no theory.4 
(b) Another worthwhile source is the title essay in The Prevalence of Humbug by Max Black [(1985)].   
Am uncertain just how close in meaning the word humbug is to the word bullshit.  Of course, the 
words are not freely and fully interchangeable; it is clear that they are used differently.  But the 
difference appears on the whole to have more to do with considerations of gentility, and certain 
other rhetorical parameters, than with the strictly literal modes of significance that concerns me 
most.. It is more polite, as well as less intense, to say “Humbug!” than to say “Bullshit!”  For the 
sake of this discussion, I shall assume that there is no other important difference between the two.5 
                                                 
1  See:  Ground Zero Premise 
2 Our instinctive apparatus consists of two parts -- the one tending to further our own life and that of our 
descendants, the other tending to thwart the lives of supposed rivals. The first includes the joy of life, and love, and 
art, which is psychologically an offshoot of love. The second includes competition, patriotism, and war. 
Conventional morality does everything to suppress the first and encourage the second.  True morality would do the 
exact opposite. Our dealings with those whom we love may be safely left to instinct; it is our dealings with those 
whom we hate that ought to be brought under the dominion of reason. In the modern world, those whom we 
effectively hate are distant groups, especially foreign nations. We conceive them abstractly, and deceive ourselves 
into the belief that acts which are really embodiments of hatred are done from love of justice or some such lofty 
motive (Russell 1928, p 13). 
3  Funk 2008c, appendix iv 
4  Frankfurt 2005, p 1 
5  Ibid, pp 4-6 
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Cognative Dissonance 
(a) The strongest guard is placed at the gateway to nothing… because the condition of emptiness is 
too shameful to be divulged.1   
(b) Also see Festinger 1957. 
 
Consilience 
(a) Of the two major methods for inferring history from single configurations, consilience calls 
upon a greater range of evidence.  This word, coined by William Whewell in 1840, means 
"jumping together." By this term, Whewell referred to proof by coordination of so many otherwise 
unrelated consequences under a single causal  explanation that no other organization of data seems 
conceivable.  In a sense, consilience defines the larger method underlying all Darwin's inference 
from historical records In a more specific context, I use consilience... for Darwin's principal tactic 
of bringing so many different points of evidence to bear on a single subject, that history wins assent 
as an explanation by overwhelming  confirmation and unique coordination.2 
 
Cultural Evolution 
(a) Theoretical models of cultural transmission and observations of the development of societies 
suggest that patterns in cultural evolution do occur.... Cultural change, like genetic evolution, can 
follow theoretically derived patterns.3 
(b) It may be that cultural process will often mimic genetic ones; but there is one distinction which 
needs to be made between kinds of cultural inheritance.  First, consider a case in which all children 
acquire some trait by imitating their mothers, and in which mothers pass n the trait by imitating 
their mothers, and in which mothers pass on the trait which they themselves acquired.  In the 
evolution of such traits, ‘fitness’ would be measured by the Darwinian fitness of mothers; those 
traits would increase which enabled their possessors to survive and have more children.  At the 
opposite extreme, suppose that each child acquires some trait by imitating a mentor who is not a 
parent, but who is judged to be ‘successful’ by some criterion.  Traits will then increases which 
ensure ‘success’, however that is measured.  Since the criteria of success are themselves to some 
degree culturally determined, a much more complex, but perhaps more realistic, process is 
involved.4 
 
Darwinian Fitness 
(a) The term Darwinian fitness refers to the capacity of a variant type to invade and displace the 
resident population in competition for available resources (Demetrius & Ziehe 2007, abstract).5  
(b) Darwinian fitness of a biological trait refers to the contribution to successive generations made 
by individuals possessing the trait. This contribution depends on the age-specific fecundity and 
mortality of the individuals in the population.  …For human populations, …two [examples] of 
Darwinian fitness [measurements are] the Malthusian parameter, which describes the rate of increase 
of the actual population size, and entropy which describes the rate of increase of the effective 
population size (Demetrius et. al. 1984, abstract).6  
(c) Imagine that two… [people] are contesting a resource of value V.  By ‘value’, I mean that the 
Darwinian fitness of an individual obtaining the resource would be increased by V.  Note that the 
individual which does not obtain the resource need not have zero fitness.  Imagine, for example, 
that the ‘resourse’ is a territory in a favourable habitat, and that there is adequate space in a less 
favourable habitat in which losers can breed.  Suppose, also, that animals with a territory in a 
                                                 
1  Fitzgerald 1934, p 60 
2 Gould 2002, p 104 
3 Rogers & Ehrlich 2008, p 3416. 
4  Maynard Smith 1982, p 172. 
5  Demetrius & Ziehe 2007, abstract 
6  Demetrius et. al. 1984, abstract 
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favourable habitat produce, on average, 5 offspging, and that those breeding in the less favourable 
habitat produce 3 offspring.  Then V would equal 5-3=2 offspring.  Thus V is the gain in fitness to 
the winner, and losers do not have zero fitness.1 
(d) Evolutionary game theoretic models may often be given both a biological and a cultural 
evolutionary interpretation. In the biological interpretation, the numeric quantities which play a 
role analogous to "utility" in traditional game theory correspond to the fitness (typically Darwinian 
fitness) of individuals.  How does one interpret "fitness" in the cultural evolutionary interpretation? 
     In many cases, fitness in cultural evolutionary interpretations of evolutionary game theoretic 
models directly measures some objective quantity of which it can be safely assumed that (1) 
individuals always want more rather than less and (2) interpersonal comparisons are meaningful. 
Depending on the particular problem modeled, money, slices of cake, or amount of land would be 
appropriate cultural evolutionary interpretations of fitness (SEP 2002). 
(e) In traditional game theory, a strategy's fitness was measured by the expected utility it had for the 
individual in question. Yet evolutionary game theory seeks to describe individuals of limited 
rationality (commonly known as “boundedly rational” individuals), and the utility theory employed 
in traditional game theory assumes highly rational individuals. Consequently, the utility theory used 
in traditional game theory cannot simply be carried over to evolutionary game theory. One must 
develop an alternate theory of utility/fitness, one compatible with the bounded rationality of 
individuals, that is sufficient to define a utility measure adequate for the application of evolutionary 
game theory to cultural evolution (SEP 2002). 
 
Denaturalization of Economics 
[During] the late eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth, … economic theorists [came] to posit 
and identify an economy as a distinct entity and maintain that it was subject, not to natural 
processes, but to the operation of human laws and agency. …Until the mid-nineteenth century, 
economic theorists regarded the phenomena of their discourse as part of the same natural work 
studied by natural philosophers.  Not only were economic phenomena understood mostly by drawing 
analogies to natural phenomena, but they were also viewed as contiguous with nature.  Economic discourse 
was, in short, considered to be part of natural philosophy and not, as we would now deem it, a 
social or human science.  It did not then address an autonomous sphere as it does today. 
     How and why political economists came to see the economic domain as severed from the 
physical world, as the product of human action, human deliberation, and human institutions, …[is] 
the… denaturalization of the economic order.2 
 
Economic Power 
(a) Economic power, unlike military power, is not primary, but derivative.  Within one State, it depends on 
law; in international dealings it is only on minor issues that it depends on law, but when large issues 
are involved it depends upon war or the threat of war.  It has been customary to accept economic power 
without analysis, and this has led, in modern times, to an undue emphasis upon economics, as 
opposed to war and propaganda, in the causal interpretation of history.   
      Apart from the economic power of labour, all other economic power, in its ultimate analysis, consists in 
being able to decide, by the use of armed force if necessary, who shall be allowed to stand upon a given piece of 
land and to put things into it and take things from it.3  
  (b) The very nature of economics is rooted in nationalism....It would never have been developed 
except in the hope of throwing light upon questions of policy, but policy means nothing unless 
there is authority to carry it out, and authorities are national.4  
 (c) Power Projection:  The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power 
- political, economic, informational, or military - to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces 
                                                 
1  Italics Maynard Smith’s, 1982, pp 11-12. 
2  Italics mine, Schabas 2005, p 2. 
3  All italics mine, Russell 1928, p 95 
4  Robinson 1962, p 117 
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in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to 
enhance regional stability.1 
(d) Also see:  Land Power 
 
The Earth 
 
 
 
 
 
The beautiful2 orb represents the theoretical framework of so-called “ecological economics.”  The 
blue represents the Earth, the biosphere and all of its inter-connected systems, which are, naturally, 
beholden to the second law of thermodynamics.  Although practicioners ‘ecological economics’ 
refer to this as a ‘whole-systems,’ approach; as you will see in the next figure, they ‘forgot’ two 
mission-critical levels of uncertainty in their ‘system’  See:  UNIVERSAL THEORY OF VALUE: 
Axioms I-III.3   
 
 
 
 
 
This beautiful4 orb represents the theoretical framework of sound analysis informed by our 
universal theory of value based upon relative insularity.  Note that, in addition to the axioms 
represented in the previous artwork (the beautiful, but unprotected blue orb), this framework also 
recognizes two additional, fundamental assumptions:  (1) political uncertainty (white),  and (2) 
planetary uncertainty (red).  As you can see, this is the ‘bigger picture,’  or truly ‘whole systems 
analysis’ so to speak. See:  UNIVERSAL THEORY OF VALUE:  AXIOMS I-VI.5 
                                                 
1  The United States Department of Defense 2001. 
2 Artwork courtesy of William Matthew Funk © 2008. 
3 See APPENDIX I. 
4 Artwork courtesy of William Matthew Funk © 2008. 
5 See APPENDIX I. 
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EISG   Earth Island Survival Game 
This asymmetric, non-cooperative game1 models The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development on 
Earth, and, theoretically any/all inhabitable planets.  Thus our master island set includes all known 
planets capable of supporting human life.  To date this set includes a single element, the island of 
Earth: {I1}.  All bio-geo-politico regions on Earth are distinguishable by various degrees of relative 
insularity, and thus, all regions on Earth – islands, continents, and oceans alike – make up the 
‘island’ sub-set:  {i1, i2, i3, ...in}.  In other words: {i1, i2, i3, ...in} ? {I1}.    
     Our Axioms, UTV, and the Funk-Zweikampf Formula offer the ‘Rules of he Game.’  
     We animate our axioms by modelling sustainable economic development by playing the game: 
We divide earth into geo-political island ‘players’: P1: Relatively Insular States (RIS, i.e. high IR), and 
P2: Global Economic Military Superpowers (GEMS, i.e. low IR). In light of the inherent and inescapable 
political and planetary uncertainties outlined in our axioms, our UTV reveals divergent, optimizing 
strategies (ESS) for GEMS and RIS economic development.  We discover pure GEMS and pure RIS 
ESS are antithetical, yet also discover these naturally opposing, ESS represent the most tenable, 
rational solution-set possible (for the earth): GEMS = S1: (Maximum Economic Development), and RIS 
= S2: (Maximum Ecological Preservation).  We note our solution represents the Prisoner's Dilemma.  
We also note, that, ceteris paribus, based upon revealed 20th and 21st century preferences, RIS 
strategy has been sub-optimal/irrational (S1).  A stable, strategic equilibrium is attained when 
players pursue respective rational, opposing evolutionary stable economic development strategies 
(ESS); this equilibrium offers optimal windfall: surplus value is created (RIS-driven ecological 
protection and GEMS-driven planetary protection).  In essence, this non-cooperative, strategic 
equilibrium paves the way for rational, mutually beneficial, cooperative behaviour, and yields 
higher ecological and planetary insularities, and thus surplus economic and biologic value: RIS 
maximize self-interests by maximizing their sustainable economic development opportunities by 
cooperating, forming coalitions, and struggling for greater ecological and economic insularity 
(ecological and economic preservation); GEMS maximize self-interests by maximizing their 
sustainable economic development opportunities by fighting for globalized economic development 
(‘globalization’) and planetary insularity (global defence, extraterrestrial exploration, and extra-
planetary threat mitigation, such as the finance, R&D, and deployment of NEO deflectors, 
SHIELDS, Asteroid Tugboats, etc.).  Surplus value is maximized through strategic transparency: If 
(1) all players recognize the value of respective, opposing, and antithetical, rational strategies, and 
employ the ESS, then (2) all players maximize Darwinian fitness, interact and negotiate more 
rationally, more efficiently, more peacefully, and (3) maximum global sustainable economic 
development is achieved and human survival prospects are maximized.  Darwinian fitness is 
measured on a global level by the collective ability to (1) protect and sustain natural resources and 
(2) protect and sustain the planet from nuclear exchange and extra-planetary threats.  We 
demonstrate our solution is as powerful at local and individual levels as it is at the national and 
regional levels, including its use as a tool for strategic decision-making under uncertainty and 
variable insularity.  Furthermore, our game illuminates a deeply entrenched, systemic RIS strategic 
error which reflects the false application of generally misunderstood economic principles and 
fundamental constitutional flaws which promote The Tragedy of the Commons.  As we play the game, 
we discover our UTV promotes maximum global insularity, and thus offers a tenable solution to The 
Problem of Sustainable Development. 
 
                                                 
1   Although haste may bring one to a premature conclusion that our game could ‘be’ or ‘become’ cooperative, it is in 
inevidably non-cooperative, as we are (1) unable to ‘communicate’ with the future (i.e. planetary uncertainties), 
and (2) ‘communicate’ with other nation’s intentions  (i.e. political uncertainties).  See: non-cooperative game 
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Einfühlung 
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical 
analysis nor to be susceptible of it. The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man—
whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory—may be of great interest to 
empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. This latter is 
concerned not with questions of fact (Kant’s quid facti?), but only with questions of justification or 
validity (Kant’s quid juris?). Its questions are of the following kind. Can a statement be justified? 
And if so, how? Is it testable? Is it logically dependent on certain other statements? Or does it 
perhaps contradict them? In order that a statement may be logically examined in this way, it must 
already have been presented to us. Someone must have formulated it, and submitted it to logical 
examination.  
     Accordingly I shall distinguish sharply between the process of conceiving a new idea, and the 
methods and results of examining it logically. As to the task of the logic of knowledge—in 
contradistinction to the psychology of knowledge—I shall proceed on the assumption that it consists 
solely in investigating the methods employed in those systematic tests to which every new idea must 
be subjected if it is to be seriously entertained.  
     Some might object that it would be more to the purpose to regard it as the business of 
epistemology to produce what has been called a ‘rational reconstruction’ of the steps that have led 
the scientist to a discovery—to the finding of some new truth. But the question is: what, precisely, 
do we want to reconstruct? If it is the processes involved in the stimulation and release of an 
inspiration which are to be reconstructed, then I should refuse to take it as the task of the logic of 
knowledge. Such processes are the concern of empirical psychology but hardly of logic. It is another 
matter if we want to reconstruct rationally the subsequent tests whereby the inspiration may be 
discovered to be a discovery, or become known to be knowledge. In so far as the scientist critically 
judges, alters, or rejects his own inspiration we may, if we like, regard the methodological analysis 
undertaken here as a kind of ‘rational reconstruction’ of the corresponding thought processes. But 
this reconstruction would not describe these processes as they actually happen: it can give only a 
logical skeleton of the procedure of testing. Still, this is perhaps all that is meant by those who speak 
of a ‘rational reconstruction’ of the ways in which we gain knowledge.  
     It so happens that my arguments in this book are quite independent of this problem. However, 
my view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical method of 
having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. My view may be expressed by saying 
that every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or ‘a creative intuition’, in Bergson’s sense. In 
a similar way Einstein speaks of the ‘search for those highly universal laws . . . from which a picture 
of the world can be obtained by pure deduction. There is no logical path’, he says, ‘leading to these 
. . . laws. They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an intellectual love 
(‘Einfühlung’) of the objects of experience.’1 
 
Equilibrium 
(a) The notion of an equilibrium point... yields a generalization of the concept of the solution of a 
two-person...game. It turns out that the set of equilibrium points of a two-person...game is simply 
the set of all pairs of opposing "good strategies."2 
 (b) A Nash equilibrium is defined as a strategy combination with the property that every player’s 
strategy is a best reply to the other players’ strategies.  This of course is true also for Nash equilibria 
in mixed strategies. But in the latter case, besides his mixed equilibrium strategy, each player will also 
have infinitely many alternative strategies that are his best replies to the other players’ strategies. This 
will make such equilibria potentially unstable.3 
 
   
                                                 
1  Popper 1959, pp 7-9. 
2 Nash 1950, p 286. 
3 Harsanyi 1994, p 167. 
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Evolutionary Game Theory 
(a) Evolutionary theorizing has a long tradition in economics.  Only recently has this approach been 
brought into the framework of noncooperative game theory.  Evolutionary game theory studies the 
robustness of strategic behavior with respect to evolutionary forces in the context of games played 
many times in large populations of boundedly rational agents.  This new strand in economic theory 
has... opened up doors to other social sciences.1 
 (b) Nowadays it almost seems to be obvious that the correct application of Darwinism to problems 
of social interaction among animals requires the use of non-cooperative game theory, but when this 
idea was first conceived it was a revolutionary great insight.2 
 
ESS  Evolutionary Stable Strategy 
(a) Maynard Smith and Price (1973) introduced the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy 
(ESS). Initially they were not aware of the relationship between the concept of an ESS and that of a 
Nash equilibrium. Rational game theory looked at mixed strategies as produced by conscious 
randomization.  Nash’s interpretation of a mixed equilibrium as a mass action phenomenon was 
buried in his unpublished dissertation and not found in textbooks on game theory.  In biology the 
mass action interpretation is very natural and guided the work on evolutionary stability already from 
its beginning....  They defined an ESS as a strategy prescribed by a symmetric equilibrium point.3 
(b) One of the great discoveries of game theory came in the early seventies, when the biologists 
John Maynard Smith and George Price realized that strategic equilibrium in games and population 
equilibrium in the living world are defined by the same equations. Evolution be it genetic or 
memetic – leads to strategic equilibrium.4 
(c) The first explicit use of game theory terminology in this context was by Hamilton (1967), who 
sought for an ‘unbeatable strategy’ for the sex ratio when there is local competition for mates.  
Hamilton’s ‘unbeatable strategy’ is essentially the same as an ESS as defined by Maynard Smith & 
Price (1973).5 
(d) An ESS is a strategy such that, if all the members of a population adopt it, then no mutant 
strategy could invade the population under the influence of natural selection.6 
(e) A theoretical analysis is made of the evolution of behavioural strategies in contest situations. It is 
assumed that behaviour will evolve so as to maximize individual fitness. If so, a population will 
evolve an ‘evolutionarily stable strategy’, or ESS, which can be defined as a strategy such that, if all 
members of a population adopt it, no ‘mutant’ strategy can do better. A number of simple models 
of contest situations are analysed from this point of view. It is concluded that in ‘symmetric’ 
contests the ESS is likely to be a ‘mixed’ strategy; that is, either the population will be genetically 
polymorphic or individuals will be behaviourally variable. Most real contests are probably asymmetric, 
either in pay-off to the contestants, or in size or weapons, or in some ‘uncorrelated’ fashion; i.e. in a fashion 
which does not substantially bias either the pay-offs or the likely outcome of an escalated contest. An example of 
an uncorrelated asymmetry is that between the ‘discoverer’ of a resource and a ‘late-comer’. It is shown that 
the ESS in asymmetric contests will usually be to permit the asymmetric cue to settle the contest 
without escalation. Escalated contests will, however, occur if information to the contestants about 
the asymmetry is imperfect.7 
 
                                                 
1 Weibull 2002, abstract. 
2 Selten 1994, p 168. 
3 Selten 1994, p 168. 
4  Aumann 2005, p 352 
5  Maynard Smith 1982, p 2 
6  Ibid, p 10 
7  Italics mine, Maynard Smith & Parker 1976, abstract 
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Fortuna, Fortune 
(1) She was to be found on the back of many Roman coins, holding a cornucopia in one hand and a 
rudder in the other.  She was beautiful and usually wore a light tunic and a coy smile.  Her name 
was Fortune.  She had originated as a fertility goddess, the firstborn of Jupiter, and was honoured 
with a festival on the 25th of May and with temples throughout Italy, visited by the barren and 
farmers in search of rain.  But gradually her remit had widened, she had become associated with 
money, advancement, love and health.  The cornucopia was a symbol of her power to bestow 
favours, the rudder’s course, maintaining an imperturbable smile as she watched us choke to death 
on a fishbone or disappear in a landslide. 
(b) Because we are injured most by what we do not expect, and because we must expect everything 
(‘There is nothing which Fortune dies not dare’), we must, proposed Seneca, hold the possibility of 
disaster in mind at all times.  No one should undertake a journey by car, or walk down the stairs, or 
say goodbye to a friend, without an awareness, which Seneca would have wished to be neither 
gruesome nor unnecessarily dramatic, of fatal possibilities (Botton 2000, p 87). 
(c) When a wise man is told that his suitcase has been lost in transit, he will resign himself in 
seconds to the fact.  Seneca reported how the founder of Stoicism had behaved upon the loss of his 
possessions: 
     When Zeno received news of a shipwreck and heard that all his luggage had been sunk, he said, 
‘Fortune bids me to be a less encumbered philosopher’ (Ibid, p 108). 
(d) Seneca’s wisdom was more than theoretical.  Exiled to Corsica, he found himself abruptly 
stripped of all luxuries.  The island had been a Roman possession since 238 BC, but it had not 
enjoyed the benefits of civilization.  The Romans on the island rarely settled outside two colonies 
on the east coast, Aleria and Mariana, and it was unlikely that Seneca was allowed to inhabit them, 
for he complained of hearing only ‘barbaric speech’ around him, and was associated with a 
forbidding building near Luri at the northing tip of the island known since ancient times as ‘Seneca’s 
Tower’.   
     Conditions must have contrasted painfully with life in Rome.  But in a letter to his mother, the 
former wealthy statesman explained that he had managed to accommodate himself to his 
circumstances, thanks to years of morning [] and periods of thin soup: 
Never did I trust Fortune, even when she seemed to be offering money, public office, 
influence – I relegated to a place from which she could take them back without disturbing 
me.  Between them and me, I have kept a wide gap, and so she has merely taken them, not 
torn them from me (Ibid, p 99). 
(e) [The wise] will start each day with the thought…  Fortune gives us nothing which we can really 
own.  Nothing, whether public or private, is stable; the destinies of men, no less than those of 
cities, are in a whirl.  Whatever structure has been reared by a long sequence of years, at the cost of 
great toil and through the great kindness of the gods, is scattered and dispersed in a single day.  No, 
he who has said ‘a day’ has granted too long a postponement to swift misfortune; an hour, an instant 
of time, suffices for the overthrow of empires.  How often have cities in Asia, how often in Achaia, 
been laid low by a single shock of earthquake?  How many towns in Syria, how many in  Macedonia, 
have been swallowed up?  How often has this kind of devastation laid Cyprus in ruins?  We live in 
the middle of things which have all been destined to die.  Mortal have you been born, to mortals 
have you given birth.  Reckon on everything, expect everything (Botton 2000, p 91). 
 
Funk-Zweikampf Formula 
Our formula is derived from the logical and theoretical implications of our unified theory of value, 
based upon our observation that Value (V) is a derivative function of relative insularity (IR): V=f´(IR). 
     IR is determined with multiple regression analysis of: Military Power (GDP + population + annual 
defense spending + soldiers + NPT Treaty status),1 Land Area (km2), Distance from nearest Continent (km), 
                                                 
1  The main metrics of world power… are gross domestic product (GDP), population, defense spending, and a less 
precise factor that includes innovation in technology.  Power is summed as a percentage of total global power: 
Fourteen nations hold at least a 1 percent share. The United States holds about 20 percent of global power; the 
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Distance from nearest Neighbour (km), Nearest Neighbour Military Power, Nearest Neighbour Land Area (km2), 
Elevation (m),  Renewable Water Resources (m3/person/year), Food Imports (%), Population Density (p/km2), 
Exclusive Economic Zone (km2), International Airports (n), Deep Water Harbours (n), Marine Links, (n) Land 
Links (n), Forests (% km2), Fishery (Kg/person/year) Commercial Agriculture (% km2), Organic Agriculture (% 
km2), Nature Preserve (%k m2), Tourist Visits (Land Area/n ), Irrigation I (m3/person/year) Irrigation II (% 
km2), Industrial Water Consumption (m3/person/year), Organic Water Pollutants (Land Area/ 
grammes/p/day), and Cultural Homogeneity (%).  Depending upon research objectives (especially with 
relatively small islands), two additional qualitative inputs – Sovereign Status and Constitutional 
balance – may be considered. Our formula’s multiple regression output offers Darwinian fitness – 
the economic and biologic value for each corresponding politico-biogeographic ‘island.’1  This value 
suggests resource holding power (RHP) – the ability for citizens of each, corresponding politico-
biogeopraphic ‘island’ to protect, maintain, and hold (by Land Power and sustainable harvest 
practices alike, for example), property rights (Land Area, EEZ, Forests, Renewable Water 
Resources, Nature Preserves, etc.). 
      Although the scope of our inquire is limited to human interests, a reformulation for other 
species may be derived with modest alterations – military power, for example, is re-formulated as 
hunting power (size  + population), and all non purely biogeographic values (EEZ, land links, airports, 
etc.) are merely excluded.  
 
Game  
First, one must distinguish between the abstract concept of a game, and the individual plays of that 
game.  The game is simply the totality of the rules which describe it.  Every particular instance at 
which the game is played – in a particular way – from beginning to end, is a play. 
     Second, the corresponding distinction should be made for the moves, which are the component 
elements of the game.  A move is the occasion of a choice between various alternatives, to be made 
either by one of the players, or by some device subject to chance, under conditions precisely 
prescribed by the rules of the game.  The move is nothing but this abstract “occasion,” with the 
attendant details of description – i.e. a component of the game.  The specific alternative chosen in a 
concrete instance – i.e. in a concrete play – is the choice.  Thus the moves are related to the choices 
in the same way as the game is to the play.  The game consists of a sequence of moves, and the play 
of a sequence of choices. 
     Finally, the rules of the game should not be confused with the strategies of the players…  The 
distinctions which we stress must be clear from the start.  Each player selects his strategy – i.e. the 
general principles governing his choices – freely.  While any particular strategy may be good or bad 
– provided that these concepts can be interpreted in an exact sense – it is within the player’s 
discretion to use or to reject it.  The rules of the game, however, are absolute commands.  If they 
are infringed, then the whole transaction by definition ceases to be the game described by those 
rules.2 
 
Game Theory 
 (a) It is conventional to call these situations "games" when they are being studied from an abstract 
mathematical viewpoint.  Here the original situation is reduced to a mathematical description, or 
model. In the abstract "game" formulation only the minimum quantity of information necessary for 
                                                                                                                                                 
European Union (considered as a unified actor) and China, about 14 percent each. India holds about 9 percent. 
Brazil, South Korea, and Russia hold about 2 percent each. In moving toward 2015, the United States will first gain 
power, then decline somewhat, ending up at about where it is now. The EU, however, will lose power, as will all 
non-U.S. members of the G-8. The gainers will be China and India. The assessment identifies possible alliances that 
could match the power of the United States acting alone or with its traditional allies. It also examines the most 
likely locations for future conflict. Asia is by far the most dangerous region, with six of the eight conflict-prone 
bilateral balances involving China (Treverton & Jones 2005). 
1  See Island 
2  Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, p 49 
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the solution is retained.  What the actual alternative courses of action are among which the 
individuals must choose is not regarded as essential information.  These alternatives are treated as 
abstract objects without special qualities and are called "strategies."  Only the attitudes (like or 
dislike) of the two individuals towards the ultimate results of the use of the various possible 
opposing pairs of strategies are considered.1 
 (b) A game is non-cooperative if it is impossible for the players to communicate or collaborate in 
any way (Ibid, pp 128-129). 
 (c) Game theory is a theory of strategic interaction. That is to say, it is a theory of rational behavior in 
social situations in which each player has to choose his moves on the basis of what he thinks the 
other players’ countermoves are likely to be. 
      After preliminary work by a number of other distinguished mathematicians and economists, 
game theory as a systematic theory started with von Neumann and Morgenstern’s book, Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior, published in 1944. One source of their theory was reflection on games 
of strategy such as chess and poker. But it was meant to help us in defining rational behavior also in 
real-life economic, political, and other social situations.2 
(d) Game theory concerns the behaviour of decision makers whose decisions affect each other. Its 
analysis is from a rational rather than a psychological or sociological viewpoint. It is indeed a sort of 
umbrella theory for the rational side of social science, where ‘social’ is interpreted broadly, to 
include human as well as non-human players (computers, animals, plants). Its methodologies apply 
in principle to all interactive situations, especially in economics, political science, evolutionary 
biology, and computer science. There are also important connections with accounting, statistics, 
the foundations of mathematics, social psychology, law, business, and branches of philosophy such 
as epistemology and ethics.3 
 
GEMS  Globalized Economic Military Superpowers 
Presently, the USA represents the only true player in this arena, but our definition includes all five 
signatory members of the UK-USA agreement (UK, USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), 
often referred to as AUSCANZUKUS, and six other nations which have developed, detonated, and 
presently maintain nuclear weapons (Russia, France, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea). 
   
Ground-Zero Premise 
(i) Survival and reproduction is the basic, continuing, inescapable problem for all living organisms; 
life is at bottom a survival enterprise. It follows that survival is the... “problem” for human societies 
as well; it is a prerequisite for any other, more exalted objectives. Although the term “adaptation” is 
also familiar to social scientists, until recently it has been used only selectively, and often very 
imprecisely....Our economic and social life (and the motivations behind our revealed preferences 
and subjective utility assessments), not to mention the actions of modern governments... [is] either 
directly or indirectly related to the meeting of our basic survival needs.4 
 
Hecatomb 
“Hecatomb,” an unfamiliar word in English, should enter the vocabulary of all evolutionists as a 
wonderfully appropriate description for this key aspect of Darwinism.  A hecatomb I, literally, an 
offering of a hundred oxen in sacrifice.  Yet, even in Homer, the word had come to designate any 
large number of deaths incurred as a sacrifice for some intended benefit – a good description of 
natural selection.  And hecatomb trips so much more lightly off the tongue than “substitutional 
load.”5 
 
                                                 
1  Nash 1953, p 128 
2  All italics Harsanyi's 1994, p 136 
3  Aumann 2008 
4 Corning 2000, abstract 
5  Gould 2002, p 122 
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Historicism 
(1) It will be enough if I say here that I mean by ‘historicism’ an approach to the social sciences 
which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is 
attainable by discovering the ‘rhythms’ or the ‘patterns’, the ‘laws’ or the ‘trends’ that underlie the 
evolution of history. Since I am convinced that such historicist doctrines of method are at bottom 
responsible for the unsatisfactory state of the theoretical social sciences…, my presentation of these 
doctrines is certainly not unbiased.1 
 
Hollywood Economics 
Hayek (1991) lamented the difficulty in distinguishing between economics and excrement, and 
Hemingway (1958) noted “The most essential gift for a good writer is a built-in, shock-proof, 
bullshit detector.” In this spirit and within the context of Frankfurt's (2004) Theory of Bullshit, we 
have constructed a bullshit detector for economics. This apparatus is carefully calibrated to detect 
the Seven Deadly Sins of 'Hollywood Economics': Hubris, Intellectual Dishonesty, Greed, 
Mathematical Mania, Physics Fetishes, Conditions of Emptiness, and Sunspots.  We trace the 
philosophical and methodological origin of these traits to its source, The Problem of Induction, then 
illustrate with examples from Plato to the present, including detailed analysis from the illuminating 
cases of Long Term Capital Management and William Stanley Jevons' sunspot theory.  
     Furthermore, we demonstrate the contemporary effectiveness of this apparatus by detecting 
hereto undetected economic bullshit, namely Arthur de Vany's (2004) Hollywood Economics: How 
Extreme Uncertainty Shapes the Film Industry. In the process, we falsify de Vany's 'Nobody knows 
anything' theory and advance our replacement theory: George Lucas2 knows something.3  
 
Hyperbolic Discounting 
 It is well known from the literature that hyperbolically discounting agents tend to postpone actions 
into the future from an ex ante point of view, as declining discount rates imply a change of the 
relative weight of benefits and losses. It is also well known that naive agents tend to further 
procrastinate actions from an ex post point of view, as they are not aware of the time-inconsistency 
problem and that this outcome may be inefficient (e.g., Ackerlof 1991, O’Donoghue and Rabin 
1999). Yet, the interesting result derived from the exposition so far is that, no matter whether 
agents are sophisticated or naive, they will never invest in environmental protection if agent 1 does 
not invest (Winker 2006, p 13). 
 
In/ in  Island 
(a) Islands are synecdoches: their understanding facilitates a ‘coming to grips’ with a more complex 
whole. They also act as advance indicators or extreme reproductions of what is future elsewhere. 
Crucial, new insights into evolutionary theory, and the realization of so much species differentiation 
on islands in modern zoogeography, are primarily due to the unwitting and haphazard stumbling of 
what, at first sight, may have appeared to be inconsequential, island-based, island-specific 
fieldwork. This includes such investigations as the study of Darwin’s finches on the Galapagos 
Islands (Darwin 1859...) or Alfred Wallace’s study of birds-of-paradise on the Aru Islands (Wallace, 
                                                 
1  Popper 1957, p 17 
2  I came to the conclusion after 'American Graffiti' that what's valuable for me is to set standards, not to show people 
the world the way it is...around the period of this realization...it came to me that there really was no modern use of 
mythology...The Western was possibly the last generically American fairy tale, telling us about our values. And 
once the Western disappeared, nothing has ever taken its place. In literature we were going off into science 
fiction...so that's when I started doing more strenuous research on fairy tales, folklore, and mythology, and I 
started reading Joe's books. Before that I hadn't read any of Joe's books...It was very eerie because in reading 'The 
Hero with a Thousand Faces' I began to realize that my first draft of 'Star Wars' was following classic motifs...so I 
modified my next draft [of 'Star Wars'] according to what I'd been learning about classical motifs and made it a little 
bit more consistent...I went on to read 'The Masks of God' and many other books (Larsen & Larsen, 2002, p 541). 
3  Funk 2007a, abstract. 
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1880)… The forays of Bronislaw Malinowski amongst the Trobriand… Islanders of Papua New 
Guinea (1922), Margaret Mead to Samoa… (1928; 1934) and Raymond Firth to Tikopia (1936).1 
(b) The foundation to our game theoretical approach to comparative island studies rests on the 
principles of set theory, and our primary island set includes all known planets capable of supporting 
human life.  To date this set includes a single element, the island of Earth: {I1}.  All biogeographical 
regions on Earth are distinguishable to various degrees of relative insularity, and thus, all regions on 
Earth – islands, continents, and oceans alike – make up the sub-set: {i1, i2, i3, ...in}.  Thus, the 
‘islands’ of Earth are a subset Earth Island: {i1, i2, i3, ...in} ? {I1}.  
 
ISG    Island Survival Game 
(a) An asymmetric, cooperative sub-game of the Earth Island Survival Game which models The 
Problem of Sustainable Economic Development on RIS.  Darwinian fitness is measured by Resource 
Holding Power (RHP), the ability to achieve sustainable economic development by protecting and 
sustaining property and natural resource rights through time, and thus battling The Tragedy of the 
Commons.  RIS are elements of the island set: {i1, i2, i3, ...in}, and, like GEMS, are a sub-set of the 
island of Earth: {I1}. In other words: {i1, i2, i3, ...in} ? {I1}. Our Axioms (See Funk 2008e) offer the 
“Rules of he Game.”  Also see: Earth Island Survival Game. 
(b)  From:  colin macintyre, To: Matt Funk, Date: Monday, July 21, 2008 03:22 pm 
Hey Matt, Just finished reading the piece you wrote…  Here are my thoughts….  Was the final 
answer that relative insularity promotes control over land use policies, which equates to ecological 
and economic health?  [Yes Colin, exactly, sorry that wasn’t clear!]  
     I liked the example of the Island Survival Games. Yes, the farmer would want to sustain and protect their 
farm for genetic survival. I never thought of it in terms of PEI's founder population decreasing, therefore it is an 
evolutionary unstable strategy driving the founder population extinct. (I am the founder population, and 
yes we are going extinct!).  I liked how you explained: Drastic reduction in relative insularity represents 
unstable evolutionary strategy, and then used the Bridge as an example.  I agree Islanders evolved to live 
with the niches of insularity, because I feel it.  People  from away feel that they are really far away from 
everything when they are here. Islanders don't feel like they are on the outskirts, because the Island 
feels like the center of the world.  It was a great Island Studies example, explaining how the problem of the 
Bridge represent the universal worldwide problem. PEI should conduct a carrying capacity study. I didn't know 
about that point. Very interesting. I think it is great that Mustique is the only known instance of 
ecologically planned development. It is excellent that you found out about it, and I am with you 100% 
ecological heath = economic health.2 
(c).  Here's an example (rough-draft, keep in mind) of my introduction to the application of John 
Maynard Smith's Evolution and Theory of Games (1982) to the assessment of the quality of life on  PEI.  
This analysis focuses on the quality of life on Prince Edward Island at the evolutionary level, and it 
presents a particular challenge since, as Richard Dawkins noted, “our brains are built to deal with 
events on radically different timescales from those that characterize evolutionary change" [1]. Indeed, 
analysis requires the adoption of the Iroquois Confederation concept of the Seventh Generation: that it 
takes seven generations of data to offer meaningful economic analysis when it comes to The Problem 
of Sustainable Economic Development.  And although we might initially object that ‘we’ have even 
inhabited PEI for seven generations, or that even several thousand years of human life would be 
inadequate for analysis on an evolutionary time scale, our analysis of the evolutionary stability of the 
strategies which have and which continue to direct the quality of life on Prince Edward Island begins 
more than 10,500 years ago, and, we will demonstrate, offers a valuable portal for discovery. 
Building upon the foundation set by John von Neumann & Oscar Morgenstern's Theory of Games and 
Economic Behaviour, John Nash's early development of non-cooperative game theory, and many other 
notable game theorists , Smith & Price (1973) introduced the concept of an Evolutionary Stable 
Strategy (ESS), which John Maynard Smith fully developed in seminal Evolution and Theory of Games 
                                                 
1  Baldacchino 2007a, p 9. 
2  MacIntyre 2008 
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(1982). This useful tool has much to offer economic analysis, the economic analysis of islands and 
other relatively insular states in particular. Moreover, once the relatively complex mathematical 
models have been digested and properly discarded, the ESS concept, and, moreover, it's 
applicability to PEI is very clear. 
     A ‘stable’ stragegy (we'll add the "evolutionary" element shortly) is, quite simply, an unbeatable 
strategy, a strategy which always results in victory.  Children quickly learn, for example, that a 
stable strategy may be readily deployed in the game of tic-tack-toe by the player with the first 
move.  In the game of chess, however, a stable strategy has eluded every Grand Master from Bobby 
Fischer to Boris Spassky.  But, as it turns out, in many ways, the lives of humans, especially those 
whom live on islands, are not nearly as complex as the game of chess.  This is primarily due to the fact 
that humans insulate themselves into distinct political communities (nations, states, provinces), and 
often further insulate themselves into biogeographical communities (such as islands, alpine regions, 
and even deserts).  In short, our analysis is “easier on islands than on continents, because islands are 
[and/or have been] relatively free from the ebb and flow of genes.” 
     Now we'll add the ‘evolutionary’ element to an illustration which may clarify the meaning of an 
ESS. 
     Imagine an uninhabited, one million acre island.  On another island on the opposite side of the 
Atlantic, a king divides this island into ten, 100,000 acre farms, allots each farm to a single women 
from his vast (genetically speaking) kingdom, ships them across the Atlantic to the one million acre 
island, then lets the game of life begin.  At this point, the ‘game’ begins, and play is observed at two 
levels:  at the individual farm level, and island-wide as well .  Each player "wins" or "loses" based 
upon their abilities to (1) survive and (2) resist ‘invaders.’  
     From 8,600 B.C. to the 17th century various nomadic hunters, gatherers, and fishermen 
inhabited this island on a seasonal basis, but for simplicity's sake we'll refer to this group as the 
Mi'kmaq.  During this period, although the natural resource base remained well below the island's 
carrying capacity, it would be incorrect to conclude that the Mi'kmaq executed an ESS, because an 
ESS for the sustainable economic development of islands requires it must thrwart invasion - and by 
"invasion" we mean we must be able to hold the resource. 
 
Kuhnian 
(a) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn was the most influential book on the nature 
of science in the second half of the twentieth century – and arguably, the entire twentieth century. 
Nevertheless, a reminder of the book’s contents immediately makes this fact rather surprising. 
Structure purports to provide a general account of scientific change in 200 non-technical, lightly 
referenced pages, in the manner of an extended encyclopaedia entry, as the book was in fact 
originally conceived.1  
(b) For Kuhn, science is simply good at solving its self-defined problems, whose purely technical 
nature led him to dub them ‘puzzles’. But far from demoting the physical sciences, Kuhn was 
actually trying – as a latter-day Plato might – to insulate them from responsibility for real world 
effects, entanglement in which has historically prevented the social and biological science from 
taking full control of their inquiries.2 
(c) -----Original Message----- 
Greetings Dr Doherty....I am researching a theory that the rejection of Karl Popper's logic and 
methods and general acceptance (in a popular sense) of Thomas Kuhn's logic and methods have been 
detrimental to science, especially social sciences such as economics.  
     Nearly a dozen Nobel Laureates have thanked Popper and acknowledged his great influence 
upon their work: most notably, of course, is F.A. von Hayek's Sveriges Riksbank Prize Lecture and, 
perhaps the most notable example in your field may be revealed in Eccles' Nobel biography.  
     I have only been able to discover one Nobel Laureate who acknowledged Kuhn's influence and, 
                                                 
1  Fuller 2003, pp18-19. 
2  Ibid, p69. 
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curiously, this noble individual (whom of course is you!) acknowledged both Popper and Kuhn: "I 
was influenced early on by reading Arthur Koestler and Edward de Bono, and more recently by the 
writings of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn." 
     So, naturally, I'm very curious to know if, after nearly a decade, the balance of this influence or 
your opinions regarding these two philosophers of science has changed?  
     I thank you very much for your time and consideration regarding this matter, as I am inclined to 
believe the long-term prospects of human survival may hang in the balance to the ultimate answer 
to this debate. 
Any words of wisdom you are able to offer on this topic would be greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely...Matt Funk1 
--- 
From: Peter C. Doherty, Department of Immunology, St Jude Children's Research Hospital 
332 North Lauderdale, Memphis TN 38105, Tel 901-495-3470, Fax 901-495-3107, also at: 
pcd@unimelb.edu.au,  
To:Mfunk@upei.ca, Date:10/28/07 11:58 pm 
Subject: Re: Thomas Kuhn & Karl Popper: 
-----Original Message----- 
 A long time since I've read either. Popper's views re falsification of a null hypothesis seem correct to 
me. Much of the world's worst science is done by people who are determined to prove a point. 
Kuhn's idea of the paradigm shift is spot on.  
(d) The Kuhn-Popper debate, strictly speaking, refers to an encounter that took place at the former 
Bedford College, University of London on 13 July 1965, as part of the International Colloquium in 
the Philosophy of Science.  It was designed to pit a relatively young theorist of science (Kuhn, aged 
43) whose 1962 book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was touted as the latest word from the 
Unite States, against a relatively old theorist of science (Popper, aged 63) whose seminal book, The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery, had been translated into English on in 1959, a quarter-century after it 
first appeared in German (Fuller 2003, p10) 
(e) This brings me to the… source of the debate’s continuing significance.  Kuhn and Popper 
tapped into long-simmering, deep-rooted disagreements that went well beyond the pages of their 
major works on science….  Sometimes behind such scholastic fodder that frames philosophical 
debate lie opponents who are not so different from each other after all….  But sometimes the 
stereotype, for all its crudeness, does [italics Fuller’s] capture differences in sensibility that become 
deeper the more one looks.  This is certainly the case with Popper and Kuhn (Ibid, pp14-15).  
(f) The clash between Popper and Kuhn is not about a mere technical point in epistemology.  It 
concerns our central intellectual values, and has implications not only for theoretical physics but 
also for the underdeveloped social sciences and even moral and political philosophy (Lakatos 1978, 
vol 1, p 9). 
(a) I uphold the ancient theory of truth... according to which truth is the agreement with the facts of 
what is being asserted. Kuhn's views on this fundamental question seem to me affected by 
relativism; more specifically, by some for of subjectivism and of elitism, as proposed for example by 
Polanyi. Kuhn seems to me also affected by Polanyi's fideism: the theory that a scientist must have 
faith in the theory he proposes (while I think that scientists--like Einstein in 1916 or Bohr in 1913--
often realize that they are proposing conjectures that will, sooner or later, be superseded). There 
are many other such points of difference, of which perhaps the most important is my emphasis on 
objective rational criticism: I regard as characteristic of ancient and modern science the critical 
approach towards theories, from the point of view of whether they are true or false. Another 
important point seems to me that Kuhn does not seem to see the great importance of the many 
purely scientific revolutions that are not connected with ideological revolutions [all italics Popper's] 
(pp xxxi-xxxii). 
 
                                                 
1  Funk 2007d 
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Land Power 
Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit 
control over land, resources, and people.  Landpower includes the ability to: 
?? ? Impose the Nation’s will on adversaries—by force if necessary—in diverse and 
complex terrain. 
?? ?Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for a lasting 
peace. 
 ???Address the consequences of catastrophic events—both natural and manmade—to 
restore infrastructure and re-establish basic civil services. 
???Support and provide a base from which forces can influence and dominate the air and 
sea dimensions of the joint operational area.1 
 
Meditations on Hunting 
Meditations on Hunting is the most quoted book in sporting literature. It is the finest work on the 
essence and ethics of hunting. Today when both hunting and fishing are often condemned, 
Meditations takes on an even greater significance.  Ortega points out that life is a dynamic 
interchange between man and his surroundings.  He explains that hunting is part of man's very 
nature, that:  
hunting is a universal and impassioned sport...it is the purest form of human happiness.  The 
essence of hunting or fishing involves a complete code of ethics of the most distinguished 
design.  The sportsman who accepts the sporting code of ethics keeps his commandments in 
the greatest solitude with no witnesses or audience other than the sharp peaks of the 
mountain, the stern oak, and the passing animal [Bodio’s 2007 introduction to Gasset 1972]. 
 
Menger, Carl (1840 - 1921) 
(a) Founder of the Austrian School of economics, famous for contributing to the development of 
the theory of marginal utility. This refuted the labor theory of value developed by the classical 
economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo.... 
     During the course of his newspaper work he noticed a discrepancy between what the classical 
economics he was taught in school said about price determination and what real world market 
participants believed. In 1867 Menger began a study of political economy which culminated in 1871 
with the publication of his Principles of Economics (Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre), thus becoming 
the father of the Austrian School of economic thought. It was in this work that he challenged the 
classical labor theory of value with his theory of marginality. At the time Principles was largely 
ignored.... 
     Ensconced in his professorship he set about refining and defending the positions he took and 
methods he utilized in Principles, the result of which was the 1883 publication of Investigations into 
the Method of the Social Sciences with Special Reference to Economics (Untersuchungen über die Methode der 
Socialwissenschaften und der politischen Oekonomie insbesondere). The book caused a firestorm of debate, 
during which members of the Historical School of economics began to derisively call Menger and 
his students the ‘Austrian School’ to emphasize their departure from mainstream economic thought 
in Germany. In 1884 Menger responded with the pamphlet The Errors of Historicism in German 
Economics and launched the infamous Methodenstreit, or methodological debate, between the 
Historical School and the Austrian School (Menger & Hayek 1871, pp. 14-15). 
(b) The following account of his impression by a young American economist who attended 
Menger’s lectures in the winter 1892–93 may be reproduced here as representative: “Professor 
Menger carries his fifty-three years lightly enough. In lecturing he rarely uses his notes except to 
verify a quotation or a date. His ideas seem to come to him as he speaks and are expressed in 
language so clear and simple, and emphasized with gestures so appropriate, that it is a pleasure to 
follow him. The student feels that he is being led instead of driven, and when a conclusion is 
reached it comes into his mind not as something from without, but as the obvious consequence of 
                                                 
1  DOD 2005, p 1-1 
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his own mental process. It is said that those who attend Professor Menger’s lectures regularly need 
no other preparation for their final examination in political economy, and I can readily believe it. I 
have seldom, if ever, heard a lecturer who possessed the same talent for combining clearness and 
simplicity of statement with philosophical breadth of view. His lectures are seldom ‘over the heads’ 
of his dullest students, and yet always contain instruction for the brightest. 
     All his students retain a particularly vivid memory of the sympathetic and thorough treatment of 
the history of economic doctrines, and mimeographed copies of his lectures on public finance were 
still sought after by the student twenty years after he had retired, as the best preparation for the 
examinations. His great gifts as a teacher were, however, best shown in his seminar where a select 
circle of advanced students and many men who had long ago taken their doctor’s degree assembled. 
Sometimes, when practical questions were discussed, the seminar was organized on parliamentary 
lines with appointed main speakers pro and contra a measure. More frequently, however, a 
carefully prepared paper by one of the members was the basis of long discussions. Menger left the 
students to do most of the talking, but he took infinite pains in assisting in the preparations of the 
papers (Ibid, p 35). 
 
Mind-Body Problem 
The nature of the subject… makes its first task the most important and the most difficult:  clearly 
to state the problem to which it will attempt an answer.  We shall have moved a considerable 
distance towards the solution of our problem when we have made its meaning precise and have 
shown what kind of statement could be regarded as a solution. 
     The traditional heading under which our problem has been discussed in the past is that of the 
‘relation’ between mind and body, or between mental and physical events.  It can also be described 
by the questions of ‘What is mind?’ or ‘What is the place of mind in the realm of nature?’  But 
while these expressions indicate a general field of inquiry, they do not really make it clear what it is 
that we want to know.  Before we can successfully ask how two kinds of events are related to each 
other (or connected with each other), we must have a clear conception of the distinct attributes by 
which they can be distinguished.  The difficulty of the any fruitful discussion of the mind-body 
problem consists largely in deciding what part of our knowledge can properly be described as 
knowledge of mental events as distinguished from our knowledge of physical events.1  
 
Mt  Million Tons 
 
Myr  Million Years 
 
  Mustique 
Since Mustique is a small island under single ownership..., development will be inherently 
expensive.  But it will also offer the opportunity of preserving an especially high quality of 
environment .... 
     Although we have found some indications from the regional demands and projections, it is the 
nature of the island itself that must determine the actual quality and quantity of the potential 
demands that should be accommodated, firstly in terms of environment, secondly in terms of 
service problems and costs.... 
     The charm of Mustique derives largely from its hilly topography.  These hills, acted upon by the 
sea and the prevailing winds have divided the island's 1400 acres into a number of distinctly 
different microclimates, and have given rise to a curving coastline that is long (12 miles) in relation 
to the area it encloses.... 
     The variety of these separate places, with their interplay of forest, rocky headland, sandy bay and 
turquoise sea, creates an impression that makes the island seem much larger than it actually is.  The 
hills also afford fine views of the white beaches and out over the neighbouring islands.... 
     In order to discover the most suitable use for the land and achieve the best fit between the 
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activities of man and the natural systems, an ecological survey was undertaken..., for it is obvious 
that the varied geology, vegetation and wild life of Mustique and the sea around are crucial to the 
attractiveness of the island.... 
     The aim of this study was to identify areas of special interest for conservation, and to find 
ecological indicators for the degree of intensity and type of use for which the land is best suited.... 
     It is necessary to ensure that no unique species or features of outstanding natural beauty are 
destroyed by development. Similarly the extent and variety of the vegetation on Mustique 
contributes greatly to the- charm of the island, and must be preserved..... 
     Mustique is an extremely beautiful island and one which is very rich biologically.  At the same 
time, the natural resources of the island are in limited supply or extremely sensitive to 
development.  The challenge that must be met by the developers is to utilize its charm and habitat 
richness whilst maintaining its delicately balanced ecosystems in as natural a state as possible.... 
     Several primary physical features of the island combine to determine the range of possibilities for 
development. These are, most notably, the availability of water, the pronounced alternation of wet 
and dry season, the physical make-up of soils, wind velocity, salt spray and soil salinity. These same 
features also determine the kind and distribution of the naturally renewable resources of plant and 
animal communities and, at the same time, determine their response to various kinds of 
development. Careful exploitation and management will be required to ensure that the biological 
habitat-types represented in the island's ecosystems continue to contribute to the beauty and 
interest of the environment... 
     The biotic component of the island's ecosystems is seen as a resource in its own right.  It 
contributes to the quality of the landscape and contains plants and animals in a little-disturbed, 
semi-natural environment which justify conserving in their own right.  It is difficult to make an 
assessment of the conservation status of Mustique from a scientific point of view without a more 
extensive survey of neighbouring islands and literature.  However, it is clear that some individual 
species obviously deserve protection and these include the turtles and iguana.  More important, in 
the context of the proposed future development, and as an important contribution to the island's 
character, is the conservation of a range of habitat types and these should include more mature areas 
of forest, coastal scrub, sea-grape communities, and mangrove swamp... 
     There appears to be universal agreement that the scenery on Mustique is superb and this beauty 
is derived from an interplay of forest, rocky headland, sandy bay and turquoise sea.  The quality is 
partly the result of the small scale of this heterogeneity and the feeling of being on a small, secluded 
island and yet one so little exploited that an excursion to any beach or headland requires a half-day 
expedition.  This sensation of being on both a very small and a very big and varied island is 
important to preserve. 
Secondly there is a smaller scale of beauty and interest.  This is totally attributable to biological 
components of the environment such as the widely distributed solitary cacti, the palm plantations, 
epiphytic plants, windswept distorted trees, and the occasional tortoise, humming-bird or butterfly.  
Thirdly there is interest that derives from past and present forms of land-use.  Relics of the past 
include an abandoned village, Fort Shandy, Carib remains, a solitary cannon, a sugar-cane press, old 
wells and water-tanks. Present day activities also contribute to the interest of the landscape and 
most visitors will appreciate seeing cattle and ponies, fields of pigeon pea and cassava, scattered 
mangoes and tamarinds. citrus groves and banana plantations.... 
The case for maintaining and developing the agriculture of the island partly rests on the 
importance of preserving the feeling for the visitor of being part of a functioning system as well as 
to open-up views and increase diversity in the landscape.... 
Most visitors would appreciate interpretative facilities to enable them to understand more of 
the variety and richness of the flora, fauna and history of the island.  We suggest that an information 
centre be provided and short, self-guided nature trails from natural focal points such as beaches and 
the lagoon.  These should not be too arduous and should provide an alternative route back to the 
starting point.... 
Mustique is a special and unusual place. The natural resources of this beautiful island must be 
safeguarded, and all development carefully designed to complement the landscape. We have tried in 
this report to create a planning framework of which the principles are comprehensible as a kind of 
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language of "the way things are done here".1 
     In this report we have particularly concerned ourselves with the relationship between peoples 
and places.  We feel that for the charm of the present day Mustique to grow into a special identity 
that can be comprehended by people arriving on the island, the development of tourism must be 
seen to enhance the landscape and benefit the local islanders. Only if the planning framework is 
administered by people who care about this, will visitors wish to belong there and participate in the 
island's plan for growth.  For when people belong to a place and feel that they can interact with it, 
the place will grow fruitfully. We hope that the principles outlined in this report, both physical and 
methodological, will help ensure a harmonious and profitable future for Mustique.2  
 
Non-cooperative Game 
A game is non-cooperative if it is impossible for the players to communicate or collaborate in any 
way (Nash 1953, pp 128-129). 
 
Normative 
These days, one commonly asserted imperfection in the science-policy interface is that some so-
called “science” is imbued with policy preferences. Such science may be labelled as normative and it 
is potentially an insidious kind of scientific corruption. By normative science, I mean “information 
that is developed, presented, or interpreted based on an assumed, usually unstated, preference for a 
particular policy or class of policy choices.” In some forms, normative science is not obviously 
normative to policy makers or even to many scientists. Such “science” has become a serious 
problem. I believe that use of normative science is stealth policy advocacy. Science, of course, is not 
value free because it is a human enterprise, but this fact does not make all science normative. 
Policy-neutral science is a way of learning about the world and it is characterized by transparency, 
reproducibility, and independence. Consider the simple but fundamental difference between 
scientific “is” and the policy “ought.” Science deals with the “is” world (and the “was” and “will be” 
states of the world) as does the policy world, but the policy world also deals with the “oughts” and 
“shoulds.” Science is, or should be, bounded in the “is” world.3 
 
Politician 
(a) The successful politician owes his power to the fact that he moves within the accepted 
framework of thought, that he thinks and talks conventionally. It would be almost a contradiction in 
terms for a politician to be a leader in the field of ideas. His task in a democracy is to find out what 
the opinions held by the largest number are, not to give currency to new opinions which may 
become the majority view in some distant future.4 
(b) Politicians do not find any attractions in a view which does not lend itself to party declamation, 
and ordinary mortals prefer views which attribute misfortune to the machinations of their enemies. 
Consequently people fight for and against quite irrelevant measures, while the few who have a 
rational opinion are not listened to because they do not minister to any one's passions.5  
 
  Prisoner's Dilemma 
 (a) Al Tucker was on leave at Stanford in the Spring of 1950 and, because of the shortage of offices, 
he was housed in the Psychology Department.  One day a psychologist knocked on his door and 
asked what he was doing.  Tucker replied: “I’m working on game theory.“, and the psychologist 
asked if he would give a seminar on his work. For that seminar, Al Tucker invented the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma as an example of game theory.6 
                                                 
1  Reprinted from Funk 2008a. 
2 Llewelyn-Daviel et. al. 1970, pp 7 – 43. 
3  Lackey 2004, p 2 
4 Hayek 1982. 
5 Russell 1928, p3. 
6 Kuhn 1994, p 161.  Also see: Tucker 1950. 
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 (b) 5 June 2005 Eric Rasmusen (erasmuse@indiana.edu) notes…  
      Albert Tucker, “A Two- Person Dilemma,” unpublished notes (May 1950) 
     When I was writing the first edition of Games and Information back in the 1980's I was confused 
by the varying citations give for The Prisoner's Dilemma. I asked Lloyd Shapley about it, since he 
was there at the founding, and he referred me to Albert Tucker. Professor Tucker replied with this 
letter [next page] telling me about his Stanford handout [on the page following the letter] and the 
article by Straffin that tells the story, Philip Straffin, “The Prisoner's Dilemma,” UMAP Journal. 1: 
101-103 (1980). I republished both in Readings in Games and Information.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Rasmusen 2005 
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(c) The Prisoner's Dilemma... is a game where two players have the option to cooperate or to 
defect.  If both cooperate they receive the reward, R.  If both defect they receive the punishment, P.  
If one cooperates and the other defects, then the cooperator receives the sucker's payoff, S, while 
the defector receives the9 temptation, T.  The Prisoner's Dilemma is defined by the ranking 
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T>R>P>S. 
      Would you cooperate or defect?  Assuming the other person will cooperate it is better to defect, 
because T>R.  Assuming the other person will defect it is better to defect, because P>S.  Hence, no 
matter what the other person will do it is best to defect. If both players analyze the game in this rational way 
then they will end up defecting.  The dilemma is that they both could have received a higher payoff if they had 
chosen to cooperate.  But cooperation is irrational.1 
 (d)  This “collective-risk social dilemma” exists in various social scenarios, the globally most 
challenging one being...climate change.2 
 
The Problem of Chaotic Behaviour 
There are several physical situations in the solar system where chaotic behaviour plays an important 
role. Saturn's satellite Hyperion is currently tumbling chaotically. Many of the other irregularly 
shaped satellites in the solar system had chaotic rotations in the past. There are also examples of 
chaotic orbital evolution.  Meteorites are most probably transported to Earth from the asteroid belt 
by way of a chaotic zone. Chaotic behaviour also seems to be an essential ingredient in the 
explanation of certain non-uniformities in the distribution of asteroids.  The long-term motion of 
Pluto is suspiciously complicated.3 
 
Problem of Induction4 
(a) [Problem:] Our foregoing method of reasoning will easily convince us, that there can be no 
demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of 
which we have had experience.5 
[Solution:]  According to a widely accepted view... the empirical sciences can be characterized by 
the fact that they use ‘inductive methods’, as they are called. According to this view, the logic of 
scientific discovery would be identical with inductive logic, i. e. with the logical analysis of these 
inductive methods. It is usual to call an inference ‘inductive’ if it passes from singular statements 
(sometimes also called ‘particular’ statements), such as accounts of the results of observations or 
experiments, to universal statements, such as hypotheses or theories. Now it is far from obvious, 
from a logical point of view, that we are justified in inferring universal statements from singular 
ones, no matter how numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be 
false: no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the 
conclusion that all swans are white. 
     The question whether inductive inferences are justified, or under what conditions, is known as 
the problem of induction. The problem of induction may also be formulated as the question of the 
validity or the truth of universal statements which are based on experience, such as the hypotheses 
and theoretical systems of the empirical sciences....  
     Scientific statements can only attain continuous degrees of probability whose unattainable upper 
and lower limits are truth and falsity’ [Reichenbach, Erkenntnis 1, 1930, p. 186]. At this stage I can 
disregard the fact that the believers in inductive logic entertain an idea of probability that I shall 
later reject as highly unsuitable for their own purposes.  I can do so because the difficulties 
mentioned are not even touched by an appeal to probability. For if a certain degree of probability is 
to be assigned to statements based on inductive inference, then this will have to be justified by 
invoking a new principle of induction, appropriately modified.  And this new principle in its turn 
will have to be justified, and so on. 
                                                 
1 Italics ours, May & McLean, 2007, p 8.  Also see APPENDIX II, Cressman 1996, Hauert 2006, Weibull & 
Salomonsson 2006 
2 Milinski et. al. 2008, p 2291. 
3 Wisdom 1987, abstract. 
4 Also see Cournot 1838, Reichenbach 1930, 1966, Reichenbach et. al.  1971, Russell 1903, 1908, 1913, 1919, 
1948,Ludwig et. al. 1993, and Wittgenstein 1969.  Most works by Popper address this problem from various 
angles and within variable contexts. 
5 Italics ours, Hume 1739, Book I, Vol I,  p 137. 
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     Nothing is gained, moreover, if the principle of induction, in its turn, is taken not as ‘true’ but 
only as ‘probable’. In short, like every other form of inductive logic, the logic of probable 
inference, or ‘probability logic’, leads...to an infinite regress.1 
(b) Liebig (in Induktion und Deduktion, 1865) was probably the first to reject the inductive method 
from the standpoint of natural science; his attack is directed against Bacon.  Duhem (in La théorie 
physique, son objet et sa structure, 1906; English translation by P. P. Wiener:  The Aim and Structure of 
Physical Theory, Princeton, 1954) holds pronounced deductivist views. (*But there are also 
inductivist views to be found in Duhem’s book, for example in the third chapter, Part One, where 
we are told that only experiment, induction, and generalization have produced Descartes’s law of 
refraction; cf. the English translation, p. 34.) So does V. Kraft, Die Grundformen der Wissenschaftlichen 
Methoden, 1925; see also Carnap, Erkenntnis 2, 1932, p. 440.2 
 
The Problem of Ohmic Decay 
The mechanism by which the Earth and other planets maintain their magnetic fields against ohmic 
decay is among the longest standing problems in planetary science.  Although it is widely 
acknowledged that these fields are maintained by dynamo action, the mechanism by which the 
dynamo operates is in large part not understood.  Numerical simulations of the dynamo process in 
the Earth's core have produced magnetic fields that resemble the Earth's field, but it is unclear 
whether these models accurately represent the extremely low values of viscosity believed to be 
appropriate to the core.3 
 
The Problem of Solar Flux 
There has been life on Earth for at least 3,500 Myr but the assumption that a comparable future lies 
ahead may not be justified. Main sequence stars appear to increase their burning rate as they age.  
Thus the Sun, if a typical star, can be predicted to have increased its output by 30% since the Earth's 
origin 4,500 Myr ago. The maintenance of an equable climate since life began probably required 
some means of planetary thermo-stasis.  The Gaia hypothesis proposed by Lovelock and Margulis 
included an unspecified biological means for climate control. Walker... suggests an abiological 
automatic thermostasis in which the atmospheric abundance of CO2, a greenhouse gas, adjusts to 
resist the warming tendency of the increased solar flux. It is clear that whatever the mechanism, 
atmospheric CO2 is now close to its lower limit of partial pressure, so the biosphere may soon, in 
geological terms, be exposed without protection to the predicted progressive increase of solar 
luminosity.4 
 
Problem Solving 
All things living are in search of a better world. 
     Men, animals, plants, even unicellular organisms are constantly active.  They are trying to 
improve their situation, or at least to avoid its deterioration.  Even when asleep, the organism is 
actively maintaining the state of sleep:  the depth (or else the shallowness) of sleep is a condition 
actively created by the organism, which sustains sleep (or else keeps the organism on the alert).  
Every organism is constantly preoccupied with the task of solving problems.  These problems arise 
from its own assessments of its condition and of its environment; conditions which the organism 
seeks to improve. 
     An attempted solution often proves to be misguided, in that it makes things worse.  Then follow 
further attempts at solution – further trial and error movements. 
     We can see that life – even at the level of the unicellular organism - brings something 
completely new into the world, something that did not previously exist:  problems and active 
attempts to solve them; assessments, values: trial and error. 
                                                 
1 Popper 1959, pp 31-35 
2  Ibid, p 35 
3 Kuang & Bloxham 1997, abstract. 
4 All italics mine, Lovelock & Whitfield 1982, abstract. 
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     It may be supposed that, under the influence of Darwin’s natural selection, it is the most active 
problem solvers, the seekers and the finders, the discoverers of new worlds and new forms of live, 
that undergo the greatest development. 
     Each organism also strives to stabilize its internal conditions of life and to maintain it’s 
individuality – an activity whose results biologists call ‘homoeostasis’.  Yet this too is an internal 
agitation, an internal activity:  an activity that attempts to restrict the internal agitation, a feedback 
mechanism, a correction of errors.  The homoeostasis must be incomplete.  It must restrict itself.  
Were it completely successful, it would mean the death of the organism, or, at the very least, the 
temporary cessation of all its vital functions.  Activity, agitation, search are essential for life, for 
perpetual restlessness, perpetual imperfection; for perpetual seeking, hoping, evaluation, finding, 
discovering, improving, for learning and for the creation of values;  but also for perpetual error... 
     Darwinism teaches that organisms become adapted to the environment through natural 
selection.  And it teaches that they are passive throughout this process.  But it seems to me far more 
important to stress that the organisms find, invent and reorganize new environments in the course 
of their search for a better world… 
     All organisms are fully occupied with problem-solving.  Their first problem is survival.  But 
there are countless concrete problems that arise in the most diverse situations.  And one of the 
most important problems is the search for better living conditions:  for greater freedom; for a 
better world. 
     According to this optimistic interpretation, it is through natural selection and (we may suppose) 
through an external selection pressure that a strong internal selection pressure comes into being at a 
very early stage; a selection pressure exerted by the organisms upon their environment.  This 
selection pressure manifests itself as a kind of behavior that we may interpret as searching for a new 
ecological niche.  Sometimes it is even the construction of a new ecological niche. 
     This pressure from within results in a choice of niches; that is, in forms of behavior that may be 
regarded as a choice of lifestyles and of surrounding.  This must be taken to include choice of 
friends, symbiosis, and above all, perhaps most importantly… the choice of a mate…” 
 
  Pyrrho 
Sceptic:  A seeker of truth.  One who, like Pyrrho and his followers in Greek antiquity… holds that 
there are no adequate grounds for certainty as to the truth of any proposition…  Those who deny 
the competence of reason, or the existence of a justification for certitude, outside the limits of 
experience.  The difference between the two usages becomes clearer when considering ‘sceptic’s’ 
Latin origin (scepticus):  inquiring, reflective, assumed by the disciples of Phyrrho as their 
distinctive epithet… to look out (OED 1997). 
 
Ratoinal Unity of Mankind 
The fact that the rationalist attitude considers the argument rather than the person arguing is of far-
reaching importance.  It leads to the view that we must recognize everybody with whom we 
communicate as a potential source of argument and of reasonable information ; it thus establishes 
what may be described as the ‘rational unity of mankind’1 
 
RIS  Relatively Insular States 
This category includes sovereign island nations, sub-national island jurisdictions, insular provinces 
(i.e. Newfoundland & Labrador), states (i.e. Hawaii), municipalities (i.e. Vancouver Island), and 
relatively insular jurisdictions (i.e. The Alpine Convention region)  We divide geopolitical regions 
based upon relative insularity, designating two players (1) RIS and (2) GEMS, but in reality, 
naturally, the true relative insularity of each region lies along a sliding scale with a true GEMS at 
one end (the United States) and a true RIS, such as the big island of Hawaii at the other.2  
 
                                                 
1  Popper 1992, p225  
2  Funk 2008a 
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RHP  Resource Holding Power 
 (a)  The view is examined that the adaptive value of conventional aspects of fighting behaviour is for 
assessment of relative RHP (resource holding power) of the combatants. Outcomes of aggressive 
disputes should be decided by each individual's fitness budget available for expenditure during a 
fight (determined by the fitness difference between adoption of alternative strategies, escalation or 
withdrawal without escalation) and on the rate of expenditure of the fitness budget if escalation 
occurs (determined by the RHPs of the combatants). Thus response thresholds for alternative 
strategies (“assessments”) will be determined by natural selection on a basis of which opponent is 
likely to expend its fitness budget first, should escalation occur. This “loser” should retreat (before 
escalation) and the winner should stay in possession of the resource. Many aggressive decisions 
depend on whether one is a resource holder, or an attacker. Assuming the RHP of the combatants 
to be equal, there are many instances of fitness pay-off imbalances between holder and attacker 
which should weight the dispute outcome in favour of one or other opponent by allowing it a 
greater expendable fitness budget. Usually the weighting favours the holder; the attacker therefore 
needs a correspondingly higher RHP before it may be expected to win. This is not invariably the 
case, and much observed data fits the predictions of this sort of model. If assessments are perfect 
and budget expenditure rates exactly predictable, then there would never seem to be any case for 
escalation. Escalation can be explained in terms of injury inflictions (expenditures) occurring as 
discrete events; i.e. as “bouts” won or lost during fighting. Assessment can give only a probabilistic 
prediction of the outcome of a bout. A simple model is developed to investigate escalation 
situations. Each combatant assesses relative RHP; this correlates with an absolute probability of 
winning the next bout (cabs). The stake played for is infliction of loss of RHP and is determined by 
the fitness budgets of the opponents. (Each individual plays for the withdrawal of its opponent.) 
This defines a critical probability of winning (ccrit) for each combatant, above which escalation is 
the favourable strategy (cabs > ccrit) and below which withdrawal is favourable (cabs < ccrit). 
Escalation should occur only where cabs-ccrit is positive for both combatants. This model gives 
predictions compatible with the observations, indicating that RHP loss alone can be adequate to 
explain withdrawal: escalation behaviour. Withdrawal tendency will be increased by low searching 
costs. Escalations should be restricted to closely matched RHP opponents if RHP disparity is the 
major imbalance. Outside the “escalation range” of a given individual, the higher RHP individual 
wins and the lower one loses (i.e. it should withdraw after conventional display). RHP disparity and 
holder: attacker imbalance should both interact to shape the observed pattern, though their relative 
importances will depend on species and situation. In some instances selection may favour immediate 
withdrawal from an occupied territory even without assessment of RHP (Parker 1974, abstract). 
(b)  Also see Parker & Knowlton 1980 ; Maynard Smith 1982 
(c) The Great Law of the Iroquois Confederacy1 is often cited by environmentalists as one of the 
best examples of a previous, indigenous population far more skilled in the art of sustainable 
development than we are today.  But the Iroquois were far from able to ‘sustain’ economic 
development’ because they lost nearly 100% of their resources, they did not possess the RHP (and 
thus did not have an ESS) for sustainable economic development because they were not ultimately 
able to protect and hold their land, just as the islanders on Newfoundland lost their ability to protect 
their ‘land’ (in this case, their land was ‘the sea’ – their primary natural resource – the cod fishery) 
when they relinquished its protection to the Canadian confederacy.   
     And although – in the most extreme measure – Land Power is obtained and maintained by war or 
the threat of war, of course military threat is not necessary in most cases, but the element of 
coercion is necessary, which of course requires some type of material advantage.  In Canada, for 
example, Quebec has effectively coerced Ottawa to grant asymmetric rights to Canada’s largest 
Province, and, more recently Premier Danny Williams has done likewise for Newfoundland & 
Labrador, effectively reclaiming and regaining RHP (accomplished largely in the same manner as 
Quebec – their relatively newfound leverage was and remains significant off-shore oil and natural 
gas resources) which this island province unwittingly relinquished upon joining confederation.  And 
                                                 
1  In our every deliberation, we must consider the impact of our decisions on the next seven generations. 
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RHP is, ultimately, by far the best test of Darwinian fitness, since RHP is equally measurable and 
applicable for all organisms, including humans and nations!  I believe I may have captured the essence 
in a recent communiqué: 
-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Independence! Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2008 
21:56:32 -0300  
From: Matt Funk <matt@funkisland.org> To: premier@gov.nl.ca  
     Greetings from Prince Edward Island, Mr Premier! 
     You can't imagine how happy I was for you and your province when it came across the 
newswire in April that you were ‘ushering in an era of unprecedented economic 
independence for Newfoundland and Labrador,’ as the dependent nature of Atlantic Canada 
has been on my mind (and the focus of my research) since I arrived from my home in the 
United - yet very independent - States of America!  
     To my point:  I have attached a piece of recent research which I conducted and co-
authored for a deputy minister here on PEI, and I have included a link to an in-depth, 
rather exhaustive comparative study of the dependent island on which I am now a landed 
immigrant, and the evolutionary stable, highly insular, independent island of Mustique, 
which shaped and informed a rather original universal theory of value based upon relative 
insularity, which, I might add, provides a tenable solution to the most fundamental, long-
standing, open problem in economics.  I delivered this paper at the Aland International 
Institute of Comparative Islands Studies in Finland in May, and they have generously 
published the paper on their website: 
http://www.aicis.ax/images/stories/pdf/mattfunkpaper3.pdf. 
     I believe you may find my work rather intriguing, and, in fact I hope you may find it so 
intriguing that you may want to enlist my assistance for your worthy cause in 
Newfoundland and Labrador.  My wife, a native Prince Edward Islander, has served as an 
registered nurse at the QEH here on PEI for the past five years, and I have no doubt her 
skills would be of use as well.  And, as you may have noticed from the name of our 
fledgling research institute,1 we’re rather fond of a few of your uninhabited islands which 
presently serve as an illuminating, cautionary tale of the evolutionary unstable loss of 
relative insularity (which, for previous inhabitants of the Funk Islands – the Great auks – 
resulted in their extinction!).  Of course I'm sure you may be aware that the islands take 
their name from the strong scent which the auks left on the rocks and have nothing to do 
with my German heritage).  The important lesson here, as the people of Newfoundland 
learned the hard way in 1992, is that humans must preserve and fight for relative 
insularity as fiercely as any other species, including auks (and in Newfoundland's case, that 
meant fighting to preserve the insularity of the cod fishery (from foreigners and fellow 
Canadians alike). 
     In any case, if you have further interests in my abilities and are curious to hear how I 
think I may be of service to you and, in turn, to your province, I would be happy to 
outline a proposal; I would also be very pleased to forward a CV, references, or other 
                                                 
1 Funk Island..., 60 km east of Fogo Island off the northeast coast of Newfoundland, is home to more than one 
million common murres, numbers that make it the largest colony of common murre in the western North 
Atlantic.... 
      As a seabird ecological reserve, Funk Island is now known for its ability to protect seabirds.  This was not always 
the case.  In previous centuries, Funk Island was one of the major nesting areas of the Great auk, and people came 
regularly to hunt the birds and take their eggs....  The Great auk—large, flightless birds—were eventually hunted 
to extinction. 
      This loss shows how human activity can result in the extermination of… species.  Making Funk Island an ecological 
reserve has helped other… species recover from similar exploitation and near extirpation.... 
      At 5.2 km2 (5 km2 of which is the marine component), the reserve is the smallest seabird ecological reserve in 
Newfoundland and Labrador, but it's also one of the most important [Italics mine, Newfoundland & Labrador 
2008]. 
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‘island’ and/or ‘economics’ related research samples (including an intriguing study of the 
Gaspe peninsula).   I have much to offer and hope to hear from you soon! 
     In any case, Mr Premier, I congratulate and salute you for holding your course - it is 
comforting to know that Quebec is not the only province in Canada willing to fight for 
independence! 
     Bidding you Godspeed...Matt Funk  
 
     I might also note that, not only will I be following Newfoundland’s newfound independence, 
self-reliance, RHP, and relative insularity with great interest, I may also have the opportunity to 
participate.1 
 
 
Scientific Method 
(a) As a rule, I begin my lectures on Scientific Method by telling my students that scientific method 
does not exist. I add that I ought to know, having been, for a time at least, the one and only 
professor of this non-existent subject within the British Commonwealth. 
      It is in several senses that my subject does not exist, and I shall mention a few of them. 
      First, my subject does not exist because subject matters in general do not exist. There are no 
subject matters; no branches of learning—or, rather, of inquiry: there are only problems, and the urge to solve 
them. A science such as botany or chemistry (or say, physical chemistry, or electrochemistry) is, I 
contend, merely an administrative unit. University administrators have a difficult job anyway, and it 
is a great convenience to them to work on the assumption that there are some named subjects, with 
chairs attached to them to be filled by the experts in these subjects. I do not agree: even serious 
students are misled by the myth of the subject. And I should be reluctant to call anything that 
misleads a person a convenience to that person. 
      So much about the non-existence of subjects in general. But Scientific Method holds a somewhat 
peculiar position in being even less existent than some other non-existent subjects. 
      What I mean is this. The founders of the subject, Plato, Aristotle, Bacon and Descartes, as well 
as most of their successors, for example John Stuart Mill, believed that there existed a method of 
finding scientific truth. In a later and slightly more sceptical period there were methodologists who 
believed that there existed a method, if not of finding a true theory, then at least of ascertaining 
whether or not some given hypothesis was true; or (even more sceptical) whether some given 
                                                 
1  -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Response to your e-mail to the PremierDate: Fri, 19 Sep 2008 14:37:09 -
0230 
From: Skinner, Shawn <shawnskinner@gov.nl.ca>To: <matt@funkisland.org>  
 Dear Mr. Funk: 
 Thank you for your correspondence of August 25, 2008 to Premier Williams regarding your report, Quality of Life 
on Prince Edward Island.  Your letter has been forwarded to this department for a response…. 
      We have a number of initiatives underway to explore and help improve the quality of life in Newfoundland and 
Labrador, including our Poverty Reduction Strategy which has received nation-wide recognition for its progressive 
and comprehensive approach. Further information about this strategy can be found at:  
www.hrle.gov.nl.ca/hrle/poverty/default.htm. I would also like to direct you to our Community Accounts 
(www.communityaccounts.ca) maintained by the Newfoundland and Labrador Statistics Agency. The Community 
Accounts is a world recognized data and information dissemination website that provides community level data for 
quality of life indicators. I have taken the liberty of forwarding your report to appropriate persons responsible for 
each of these initiatives for their information. 
      Your report provides valuable and interesting information concerning the quality of life and cost of living. These 
issues are becoming evermore important in our changing economy, in this province and throughout the world. I 
wish you success in advancing this research in the future. 
 Sincerely 
 SHAWN SKINNER, Minister, Department of Human Resources, Labour and Employment 
 cc:  Office of the Premier, Aisling Gogan, Director, Poverty Reduction Strategy, Robert Reid, Director (A), NLSA 
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hypothesis was at least 'probable' to some ascertainable degree. 
      I assert that no scientific method exists in any of these three senses. To put it in a more direct 
way: 
  (1) There is no method of discovering a scientific theory. 
  (2) There is no method of ascertaining the truth of a scientific hypothesis, i.e., no method of 
verification. 
(3) There is no method of ascertaining whether a hypothesis is 'probable', or probably true.1 
(b) (i) The method of the social sciences, like that of the natural sciences, consists in trying out 
tentative solutions to those problems from which our investigations start.  Solutions are proposed 
and criticized. If a proposed solution is not open to objective criticism, then it is excluded as 
unscientific, although perhaps only temporarily. 
(ii) If the proposed solution is open to objective criticism, then we attempt to refute it; for all 
criticism consists in attempts at refutation.  
(iii) If a proposed solution is refuted through our criticism we propose another solution. 
 (iv) If it withstands criticism, we accept it temporarily; and we accept it, above all, as worthy of 
further discussion and criticism. 
 (v) Thus the method of science is one of the tentative attempts (or brain-waves) to solve our 
problems which are controlled by the most severe criticism. It is a critical development of the 
method of ‘trial and error’.  
(vi) The so-called objectivity of science lies in the objectivity of the critical method; that is, above 
all, in the fact that no theory is exempt from criticism, and further, in the fact that the logical 
instrument of criticism – the logical contradiction – is objective.2   
(c) Whether educational research should employ the 'scientific method' has been a recurring issue in 
its history. Hence, textbooks on research methods continue to perpetuate the idea that research 
students ought to choose between competing camps: 'positivist' or 'interpretivist'. In reference to 
one of the most widely referred to educational research methods textbooks on the market-namely 
Research Methods in Education by Cohen, Manion, and Morrison-this paper demonstrates (1) the 
misconception of science in operation and (2) the perversely false dichotomy that has become 
enshrined in educational research. It then advocates a new approach, and suggests that the fixation 
with 'science' versus 'non-science' is counterproductive, when what is actually required for good 
inquiry is a critical approach to knowledge claims.3 
(d) Scientific discovery must ever depend upon some happy thought, of which we cannot trace the 
origin; — some fortunate cast of intellect rising above all rules.  No precepts will elevate a man of 
ordinary endowments to the level of a man of genius: nor will an inquirer of truly inventive mind 
need to come to the teacher of inductive philosophy to learn how to exercise the faculties which 
nature has given him. (Whewell 1849, reprinted under the title ‘Mr Mill’s Logic’ in Butts 1968, p. 
117).  
(e)  Scientific interest in social and political questions is hardly less old than scientific interest in 
cosmology and physics; and there were periods in antiquity (I have Plato’s political theory in mind, 
and Aristotle’s collection of constitutions) when the science of society might have seemed to have 
advanced further than the science of nature. But with Galileo and Newton, physics became 
successful beyond expectation, far surpassing all the other sciences; and since the time of Pasteur, 
the Galileo of biology, the biological sciences have been almost equally successful. But the social 
sciences do not as yet seem to have found their Galileo.  In these circumstances, students who work 
in one or another of the social sciences are greatly concerned with problems of method; and much 
of their discussion of these problems is conducted with an eye upon the methods of the more 
flourishing sciences, especially physics.4 
(f)  Also see:  Kuhnian and Historicism 
                                                 
1  Popper 1956, pp 5-6. 
2  Popper 1992, pp 66-67. 
3  Rowbottom & Aiston 2006, abstract. 
4  Popper 1957, p 15 
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Scientific Worldview 
My goal is to defend what one might call a scientific worldview -- defined broadly as a respect for 
evidence and logic, and for the incessant confrontation of theories with the real world; in short, for 
reasoned argument over wishful thinking, superstition and demagoguery. And my motives for 
trying to defend these old-fashioned ideas are basically political. I'm worried about trends in the 
American Left -- particularly here in academia -- that at a minimum divert us from the task of 
formulating a progressive social critique, by leading smart and committed people into trendy but 
ultimately empty intellectual fashions, and that can in fact undermine the prospects for such a 
critique, by promoting subjectivist and relativist philosophies that in my view are inconsistent with 
producing a realistic analysis of society that we and our fellow citizens will find compelling.  
       David Whiteis, in a recent article, said it well:  
Too many academics, secure in their ivory towers and insulated from the real-world 
consequences of the ideas they espouse, seem blind to the fact that non-rationality has 
historically been among the most powerful weapons in the ideological arsenals of oppressors. 
The hypersubjectivity that characterizes postmodernism is a perfect case in point: far from 
being a legacy of leftist iconoclasm, as some of its advocates so disingenuously claim, it in fact 
... plays perfectly into the anti-rationalist -- really, anti-thinking -- bias that currently infects 
"mainstream" U.S. culture. 
     Now of course, no one will admit to being against reason, evidence and logic -- that's like 
being against Motherhood and Apple Pie. Rather, our postmodernist and poststructuralist 
friends will claim to be in favor of some new and deeper kind of reason, such as the celebration 
of "local knowledges" and "alternative ways of knowing" as an antidote to the so-called 
"Eurocentric scientific methodology" (you know, things like systematic experiment, controls, 
replication, and so forth).1 
 
Searchlight Theory of Science  
The situation can be best described by comparison with a searchlight (the ‘searchlight theory of 
science’, as I usually call it in contradistinction to the ‘bucket theory of the mind’).  What the 
searchlight makes visible will depend upon its position, upon our way of directing it, and upon its 
intensity, colour, etc. ‘ although it will, of course, also depend very largely upon the things 
illuminated by it.  Similarly, a scientific description will depend, largely, upon our point of view, 
our interests, which are as a rule connected with the theory or hypothesis we wish to test ; although 
it will also depend upon the facts described.  Indeed, the theory or hypothesis could be described as 
the crystallization of a point of view.2 
 
  Semantics 
One of the three branches into which semiotics is usually divided: the study of meaning of words, 
and the relation of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable. In formal studies, a 
semantics is provided for a formal language when an interpretation or model is specified. However, 
a natural language comes ready interpreted, and the semantic problem is not that of specification 
but of understanding the relationship between terms of various categories (names, descriptions, 
predicates, adverbs…) and their meanings. An influential proposal is that this relationship is best 
understood by attempting to provide a truth definition for the language, which will involve giving a 
full description of the systematic effect terms and structure of different kinds have on the truth 
conditions of sentences containing them. See also inferential role semantics, possible world 
semantics, reference, truth. 
 
SHIELD 
The greatest natural threat to the long-term survivability of mankind is an asteroid or comet impact 
                                                 
1  Sokal 1996b 
2  Popper 1945, vol. II, p 260 
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with the Earth.  SHIELD is an architectural concept for a comprehensive Earth defense system 
designed to discover, catalogue, calculate orbits of near-Earth Object, and to deflect potential 
impactors (Gold 2001, abstract). 
 
Social Dilemma 
(a) Life's toughest choices are not between GOOD AND BAD, but between BAD AND WORSE.  
We call these choices between lesser evils.  We know that whatever we choose, something important 
will be sacrificed.  Whatever we do, someone will get hurt. Worst of all we HAVE to choose.  We 
cannot wait for better information or advice or some new set of circumstances.  We have to decide 
NOW, and we can be sure that there will be a price to pay.  If we do not pay it ourselves, someone 
else will (Ignatieff 2004, preface). 
(b) An interactive decision in which individual interests are at odds with collective interests, the 
pursuit of individual self-interest by every decision maker leaving everyone worse off than if each 
had acted co-operatively. In empirical studies, social dilemmas are presented in one of three general 
forms, called N-person Prisoner's Dilemmas , public goods dilemmas , and resource dilemmas, and 
they have been used to model problems of inflation and voluntary wage restraint, conservation of 
scarce natural resources, environmental pollution, arms races and multilateral disarmament, mob 
behaviour, and many other social problems involving cooperation and trust. The Prisoner's 
Dilemma game is a social dilemma restricted to two interacting decision makers. See also [The 
Tragedy of the Commons]… So called because it is an extension of the Prisoner's Dilemma game 
and models social problems.1 
 
Socratic Wisdom 
(a) I am wiser than this man, for neither of us appears to know anything great and good; but he 
fancies he knows something, although he knows nothing; whereas I, as I do not know anything, so I 
do not fancy I do. In this trifling particular, then, I appear to be wiser than he, because I do not 
fancy I know what I do not know. 2 
(b) [Do not] believe anything that I suggest!  Please do not believe a word!  I know that that is asking 
too much, as I will speak only the truth, as well as I can.  But I warn you:  I know nothing, or almost 
nothing. We all know nothing or almost nothing.  I conjecture that that is a basic fact of life.  We 
know nothing, we can only conjecture:  we guess.3 
(c) Ever since the beginning of modern science, the best minds have recognized that 'the range of 
acknowledged ignorance will grow with the advance of science.’  Unfortunately, the popular effect 
of this scientific advance has been a belief, seemingly shared by many scientists, that the range of our 
ignorance is steadily diminishing and that we can therefore aim at more comprehensive and 
deliberate control of all human activities.  It is for this reason that those intoxicated by the advance 
of knowledge so often become the enemies of freedom.4 
(d) All the great… scientists were intellectually modest; and Newton speaks for them all when he 
says: ‘I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have been only a boy 
playing on the seashore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a 
prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me.’”  
     Moreover, all the great scientists realized that every solution to a scientific problem raises many 
new and unsolved problems. Our knowledge of our ignorance, becomes increasingly conscious, 
detailed and precise, the more we learn about the world. Scientific research is the best method we 
have for obtaining information about ourselves and about our ignorance. It leads us to the important 
insight that there may be great differences between us with regard to minor details of what we may 
perhaps know, yet we are all equal in our infinite ignorance.5 
                                                 
1  Colman 2006 
2 Socrates c. 399 B.C. 
3  All italics Popper's 1999, p 37 
4  Hayek1945 
5  Popper 1992, p 40. 
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(e) The Socratic maxim that the recognition of our ignorance is the beginning of wisdom has 
profound significance for our understanding of society…. This fundamental fact of man’s 
unavoidable ignorance of much on which the working of civilization rests has received little 
attention.  Philosophers and students of society have generally glossed it over and treated this 
ignorance as a minor imperfection which could be more or less disregarded…. Perhaps it is only 
natural that the scientists tend to stress what we do know; but in the social field, where what we do 
not know is often so much more important, the effect of this tendency  may be very misleading  
(Hayek 1960, pp 22-23). 
 
Strategic Equilibrium 
What do I mean by “strategic equilibrium”? Very roughly, the players in a game are said to be in 
strategic equilibrium (or simply equilibrium) when their play is mutually optimal: when the actions and 
plans of each player are rational in the given strategic environment – i.e., when each knows the 
actions and plans of the others. For formulating and developing the concept of strategic 
equilibrium, John Nash was awarded the 1994 Prize in Economics Sciences in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel, on the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.1  
 
Super-Eruptions 
(a) In the past 2 Myr, there have been, on average, two super-eruptions every hundred millennia, 
the last of which shattered the crust of New Zealand's north island 26,500 years ago.  To date, no 
mechanisms have been discovered for predicting these events; thus an eruption of this magnitude 
(VE8)  is possible within this decade and likely within 50,000 years (see below).  Post-eruption 
human survival is unlikely; even smaller eruptions (VE4, VE5, VE6) present extraordinary 
challenges. 
(b) The largest explosive volcanic eruptions (supereruptions) produce >1000 km3 of ejected 
material and ≥1000 Mt (1015 g) of submicron atmospheric aerosols and dust. These eruptions may 
be capable of creating global climatic disturbances sufficient to cause severe problems for world 
agriculture and modern civilization. Supereruptions are estimated to occur on average about every 
50,000 years, which is about twice the frequency of impacts by comets and asteroids ≥1 km 
diameter predicted to cause similar climatic effects. Prediction, prevention, and mitigation of global 
volcanic climatic disasters may be potentially more difficult than planetary protection from the 
threat of large impacts, so that explosive volcanism might limit the longevity of technological 
civilizations.2 
(c) The greatest explosive eruption in the past few hundred thousand years was the Toba (Sumatra) 
event of ∼73,500 years ago…  This event produced at least 2,800 km3 of magma… and is estimated 
to have created from 1,000 to 10,000 Mt of stratospheric dust and sulfuric acid aerosols....  The 
Toba aerosols apparently persisted for up to 6 years in the upper atmosphere...  Based on scaling up 
from smaller eruptions and computer models, stratospheric aerosol loading of ∼1000 Mt is 
predicted to have caused a “volcanic winter,” with a global cooling of 3 to 5◦C for several years, and 
regional coolings up to 15◦C...  Such a cooling is estimated to have drastically affected tropical and 
temperate vegetation and ecosystems...  All above-ground tropical vegetation would have been 
killed by sudden hard freezes, and a 50% die-off of temperate forests is predicted from hard freezes 
during the growing season... This probable climatic and ecologic disaster may have impacted 
humans.  Evidence from human genetic studies have been interpreted as indicating a severe human 
population bottleneck—a near extinction—with reductions to a total population as small as a few 
thousand at a time just prior to ∼60,000 years ago...  This is roughly the same interval as the great 
Toba eruption, and a cause and effect relationship with Toba has been proposed… and is supported 
by the predicted severe ecological effects of the eruption. 
 
                                                 
1  All italics Aumann's 2005, p 352 
2  Rampino 2002, abstract. 
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Television 
(a) Watching TV is a major human activity. Because of its immediate benefits at negligible 
immediate marginal costs it is for many people tempting to view TV rather than to pursue more 
engaging activities. As a consequence, individuals with incomplete control over, and foresight into, 
their own behavior watch more TV than they consider optimal for themselves and their well-being 
is lower than what could be achieved. We find that heavy TV viewers, and in particular those with 
significant opportunity cost of time, report lower life satisfaction. Long TV hours are also linked to 
higher material aspirations and anxiety (Frey et. al.2005). 
(b) Watching TV is a very important activity, carried out by most people in the majority of 
countries. In many countries nowadays, watching TV occupies almost as much time as working. As 
it is a totally voluntary, freely chosen activity, it seems obvious that people enjoy it, because they 
would not do it otherwise. They are more satisfied with having the opportunity to watch TV to the 
extent they do rather than watching less TV or none at all. 
      This implication is shared by standard neoclassical economic theory. Individuals are assumed to 
know best what provides them with utility and are free to choose the amount of TV consumption 
that suits them best. By revealed preference, it follows from the fact that individuals watch so much 
TV as has been empirically observed that it provides them with considerable utility. 
      Recent developments, particularly in behavioral economics, cast doubt on this conclusion. The 
theory of revealed preference has been questioned (see, for instance, Sen 1982; 1995): it is, in 
general, not possible to infer the utility produced by observing behavior, because individuals do not 
always act rationally. More concretely, anomalies and biases in behavior have been identified (e.g. 
Thaler 1992), which undermine the direct link between observed behavior and the utility gained. 
Individuals may also be subject to habits which they do not have fully under control. They may 
consume some goods, such as drugs, alcohol or tobacco to a greater extent than they find to be 
good for themselves. They are subject to a self-control problem (e.g. Schelling 1984), again 
interfering with the direct relationship proposed by revealed preference theory. As Gruber and 
Mullainathan (2002) empirically show, predicted smokers, according to their own evaluation, 
consider themselves to be better off if smoking was restricted by a tax. Finally, individuals may 
systematically mispredict the utility derived from future consumption (e.g. Loewenstein and 
Schkade 1999; Loewenstein et al. 2003). In particular, happiness research (for a survey, see Frey 
and Stutzer 2002b) has empirically shown that individuals overestimate the utility of future income 
(e.g. Easterlin 2001), at the same time as they underestimate the utility of personal interactions 
(Frey and Stutzer 2004). The consumption decisions made by individuals are systematically 
distorted according to their own evaluations. 
      This paper argues that TV viewing is a case in which the theory of revealed preference does not 
fully apply: many people watch more TV than they consider good for themselves. The extent of TV 
viewing is not generally utility maximizing. Many individuals are subject to a self-control problem, 
mainly induced by the fact that watching TV offers immediate benefits (e.g. entertainment and 
relaxation) at very low immediate marginal costs. Many costs (e.g. not enough sleep, 
underinvestment in social contacts, education or career) are only experienced in the future. 
Individuals with time inconsistent preferences are therefore unable to adhere to the amount of TV 
viewing they planned or which, in retrospect, they would consider optimal for themselves. This 
tendency is aggravated when people mispredict future costs because they underestimate utility from 
socializing and neglect changes in preference due to TV consumption. Extensive TV viewing is thus 
understood to be the result of mispredicting utility and a self-control problem, lowering 
individuals’ well-being (Ibid, pp 2-3). 
(c)  A certain Canadian city was unable to receive any TV signals up until 1973, due to its location 
in a steep valley. Otherwise, it was similar to two cities in the vicinity used as control cases. A 
study by Williams (1986) suggests that the introduction of TV crowded out other activities, in 
particular those outside the home, such as sports’ activities and visiting clubs. It also reduced the 
reading abilities and creative thinking of children and fostered more aggressive behavior and 
stereotyped ideas about gender roles. TV also reduced the problem solving capacities of adults 
(Ibid, p8). 
(d)  Popper was… very concerned about the mass media, especially television, which exercised 
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‘unlimited power without responsibility’. Indeed, the last text he published before his death was a 
pamphlet called Una patente per fare TV (A Licence to Make TV), which, far from being just a sterile 
denunciation, proposed a solution for the safeguarding of democracy and, above all, for the 
protection of young children and those least able to defend themselves from the aggressiveness of 
images and messages appearing on the small screen. What he suggested was to establish an 
organization similar to a professional body, which would train its members in certain values and 
have the power to issue reprimands for breaches of the rules (Corvi 1996, p 11) 
(4)  [Popper:] At present the greatest danger to the educational effort is television. Education just 
cannot go on if you let the television do what it likes. It is impossible for education to work against 
television unless television recognizes that it also has an educational task which overrules our mere 
entertainment. Otherwise we cannot have education. From the democratic point of view television 
must be controlled because of its potential political power which is almost unlimited. If you get 
hold of television, you can do whatever you like. And such power must be controlled. My proposal 
is to look at the problem of controlling television as a task similar to that of control of medical 
people. Medical people have to be controlled too, and they do it very largely themselves. For 
example, they have to have a certain education. The same applies to the system of control of 
lawyers, who have their own organization which controls them. Thanks to these systems of control 
the lawyers do not steal the money from their clients and doctors do not kill their patients. And 
you have to control all people who work for television in some kind of organization. They would 
have to be [admitted to] such an organization [only] on the basis of some [special] education, after 
passing appropriate examinations testing their awareness of the educational tasks, and their sense of 
responsibility. They would have to learn that their influence is very great and that their 
responsibility is equally great (Jarvie, 1999, p 36). 
 
Theory 
(a) Every scientific theory is a system of sentences…or ASSERTED STATEMENTS or, for short, 
simple STATEMENTS.1 
(b) The empirical sciences are systems of theories.  The logic of scientific knowledge can therefore 
be described as a theory of theories. 
     Scientific theories are universal statements.  Like all linguistic representations they are systems of 
signs or symbols.  Thus I do not think it helpful to express the difference between universal theories 
and singular statements by saying that the latter are ‘concrete’ whereas theories are merely 
symbolic formulae or symbolic schema; for exactly the same may be said of even the most 
‘concrete’ stateements. 
     Theories are nets cast to catch what we call ‘the world’: to rationalize, to explain, to master it.  
We endeavour to make the mesh finer and finer.2 
(c)  Hypotheses are nets: only he who casts will catch. 
  —NOVALIS3 
  
Tragedy of the Commons 
(a) A situation in which individual competition reduces the resource over which individuals 
compete, resulting in lower overall fitness for all members of a group or population.4 
(b) William Forster Lloyd (1794-1852)... made a lasting if long unrecognized mark in economics...  
From 1832 to 1837 Lloyd held the Drummond chair of political economy at the University of 
Oxford.  A collection of his lectures... were first published in 1833 in Oxford under the title Two 
Lectures on the Checks to Population.... The chief original contribution in Lloyd's discussion of 
population issues is his recognition and incisive analysis of the deleterious consequences that ensue 
“when the constitution of society is such that as to diffuse the effects of individual acts throughout 
                                                 
1  Tarski 1941, p 3. 
2  Popper 1959, pp 37-38 
3  Ibid, inscription 
4  Rankin et. al., p 1. 
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the community at large, instead of appropriating them to the individuals, by whom they are 
respectively committed.”  Lloyd's discussion of this problem... [is] best known to modern readers 
through Garrett Hardin's influential 1968 article... “The Tragedy of the Commons” .1 
(c) It should be clear by now that the idea of the commons did not suddenly arise out of nothing in 
the year 1968.  Passing references to the problem occur as far back as Aristotle, and Lloyd certainly 
saw it clearly in 1833. H. Scott Gordon's work in 1954 saw the beginning of a new concern with 
the problems presented by this politico-economic system. Yet the fact remains that a widespread 
recognition of these problems did not develop until after 1968. Why the delay? Two reasons are 
apparent.  First, a favourable climate of opinion was needed for remarks about the commons to be 
noticed.  This was created in the 1960's by the rapid growth of the environmental movement, 
which alerted people to the consequences of distributional systems. Second, it was necessary that 
the properties of the commons be stated in no uncertain terms if people were to consider the 
matter seriously. It was necessary that the human tragedy of adhering to a commons-type 
distribution be emphasized. A good, solid fortissimo minor chord had to be sounded. Before 1968 
most of the sounds were either mere grace notes or extended passages played pianissimo. The 
down-playing was for good reason, of course: the clear message of the commons threatened 
cherished beliefs and practices. Abandoning any traditional practice requires a political upset 
(though revolution may be too strong a word).2 
(d)  It is fair to say that most people who anguish over the population problem are trying to find a 
way to avoid the evils of overpopulation without relinquishing any of the privileges they now 
enjoy.3  They think that farming the seas or developing new strains of wheat will solve the problem 
-- technologically. I try to show here that the solution they seek cannot be found. The population 
problem cannot be solved in a technical way, any more than can the problem of winning the game 
of tick-tack-toe (Hardin 1968).  
(e) The tragedy of the commons… provides a useful analogy allowing us to understand why shared 
resources, such as fisheries or the global climate, tend to undergo human overexploitation.  The 
analogy, which dates back over a century before Hardin’s original paper, describes the 
consequences of individuals selfishly overexploiting a common resource.  The tragedy of the 
commons was originally applied to a group of herders grazing cattle on common land. Each herder 
only gains a benefit from his own flock, but when a herder adds more cattle to the land to graze, 
everyone shares the cost, which comes from reducing the amount of forage per cattle. If the herders 
are driven only by economic self-interest, they will each realize that it is to their advantage to 
always add another animal to the common: they sacrifice the good of the group (by forgoing 
sustainable use of the resource) for their own selfish gain.  Thus, herders will continue to add 
animals, eventually leading to a ‘tragedy’ in which the pasture is destroyed by overgrazing.  The 
difficulties inherent in protecting shared common resources, such as marine stocks or clean air, are 
well known: whereas everyone benefits from an intact resource, there is an individual-level 
                                                 
1 Population Council 1980, p 473 
2  Hardin 1977, p 1. 
3 To keep downtown shoppers temperate in their use of parking space we introduce parking meters for short 
periods, and traffic fines for longer ones. We need not actually forbid a citizen to park as long as he wants to; we 
need merely make it increasingly expensive for him to do so. Not prohibition, but carefully biased options are what 
we offer him. A Madison Avenue man might call this persuasion; I prefer the greater candor of the word coercion.  
      Coercion is a dirty word to most liberals now, but it need not forever be so. As with the four-letter words, its 
dirtiness can be cleansed away by exposure to the light, by saying it over and over without apology or 
embarrassment. To many, the word coercion implies arbitrary decisions of distant and irresponsible bureaucrats; 
but this is not a necessary part of its meaning. The only kind of coercion I recommend is mutual coercion, mutually 
agreed upon by the majority of the people affected.  
      To say that we mutually agree to coercion is not to say that we are required to enjoy it, or even to pretend we 
enjoy it. Who enjoys taxes? We all grumble about them. But we accept compulsory taxes because we recognize 
that voluntary taxes would favor the conscienceless. We institute and (grumblingly) support taxes and other 
coercive devices to escape the horror of the commons (Hardin 1968).  
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temptation to cheat (e.g. to overexploit or pollute), because cheating brings economic advantages 
to the individual, whereas costs are distributed among all individuals.  The lesson drawn from these 
studies is that solving the dilemma often requires negotiation and sanctions on disobedient 
individuals.  This changes the payoffs, so that group-beneficial behaviour also becomes optimal for 
the individual: an example would be imposing heavier taxes on polluting industries.  Hardin’s own 
main solution to the tragedy of the commons was state governance and privatization of the resource 
in question; in general, social norms as well as individual morality have been considered good 
candidates for preventing overexploitation of common resources.1 
(f) Hardin’s original analogy, involves individuals selfishly exploiting a common resource until the 
resource is reduced to the point that the individuals no longer can persist on it. Examples include 
simple competition for food, but reproductive traits, such as high virulence in parasites and laying 
larger clutches in an attempt to out-reproduce others, can also be involved. Although it has been 
suggested that only competition over an extrinsic resource should be viewed as a tragedy of the 
commons, evolutionary biologists have applied the term to a Hardin’s original essay dealt with both 
pollution and human overpopulation, but the main point of his article was that a common resource 
would always be overexploited when utilized by self-interested individuals. Pollution, climate 
change and overexploitation of fisheries all involve public goods suffering from the free-rider 
problem, and are thus examples of the tragedy of the commons. For example, the collapse of North 
Atlantic cod shows how easily common resources can be overexploited. People tend to value their 
own short-term self-interests over the long-term good of the planet, so it is difficult to solve 
environmental problems by appealing to individual goodwill only. Public awareness of resource 
limitation can even hasten overexploitation: endangered species are traded at higher prices when 
their perceived rarity increases. Convincing participants to behave in a group-beneficial way 
requires that individuals trust that the desired outcome is reachable and that free-riders will not 
benefit. Such trust is difficult to create whenever data and experience show otherwise. A flipside of 
the tragedy of the commons is that avoiding it can often be beneficial to the players involved, and 
can be described as win–win situations if policies are improved. For example, right whales often 
become entangled in lobster fishing gear. Although fishermen are not keen to reduce their income, 
a comparison of Canadian and American lobster fisheries shows that reducing the risk of 
entanglement can be achieved with no economic cost: reducing fishing effort leads to improved 
yield of lobsters per recruit. Similarly, despite considerable resistance and cynicism, marine 
reserves (areas where fishing is prohibited) can benefit all fishermen, even over the short-term. 
Policy negotiations are difficult in these situations, because people distrust others, but also because 
long-term benefits are rarely given sufficient weight. Without extensive education, such benefits 
are met with scepticism. For example, the population dynamic arguments that relate catch effort to 
expected yield in fisheries are not intuitively obvious. Easily perceived individual benefits would 
help to solve these problems. For example, using people’s desire to improve their social reputation 
could prevent exploitation of the common good, as is seen in experimental ‘climate games’ in 
which participants improve their reputation by investing publicly to sustain the global climate. What 
is striking is that organisms with little cognitive ability are frequently able to resolve the tragedy with little or 
no cognitive or communicative abilities. With our advantage of communication and foresight, solutions 
to human tragedies of the commons should be within reach, but they are best solved, as Hardin 
advocated, using ‘mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon’.2 
(g) Scientific certainty and consensus in itself would not prevent overexploitation and destruction of 
resources.  Many practices continue even in cases where there is abundant scientific evidence that 
they are ultimately destructive.  An outstanding example is the use of irrigation in arid lands. 
Approximately 3000 years ago in Sumer, the once highly productive wheat crop had to be replaced 
by barley because barley was more salt-resistant. The salty soil was the result of irrigation. E. W. 
Hilgard pointed out in 1899 that the consequences of planned irrigation in California would be 
similar. His warnings were not heeded. Thus 3,000 years of experience and a good scientific 
                                                 
1  Rankin et. al., p 643. 
2  Italics ours, bid, p 644. 
On the Problem of  Vague Terms:  A Glossary of Clearly Stated Assumptions & Careful, Patient Descriptions        
 
page 44 of 63 
understanding of the phenomena, their causes, and the appropriate prophylactic measures are not 
sufficient to prevent the misuse and consequent destruction of resources. 1 
(h) Will a group of people reach a collective target through individual contributions when everyone 
suffers individually if the target is missed?  This ‘‘collective-risk social dilemma’’ exists in various 
social scenarios, the globally most challenging one being the prevention of dangerous climate 
change. Reaching the collective target requires individual sacrifice, with benefits to all but no 
guarantee that others will also contribute. It even seems tempting to contribute less and save money 
to induce others to contribute more, hence the dilemma and the risk of failure. Here, we introduce 
the collective-risk social dilemma and simulate it in a controlled experiment: Will a group of people 
reach a fixed target sum through successive monetary contributions, when they know they will lose 
all their remaining money with a certain probability if they fail to reach the target sum? We find 
that, under high risk of simulated dangerous climate change, half of the groups succeed in reaching 
the target sum, whereas the others only marginally fail. When the risk of loss is only as high as the 
necessary average investment or even lower, the groups generally fail to reach the target sum. We 
conclude that one possible strategy to relieve the collective-risk dilemma in high-risk situations is to 
convince people that failure to invest enough is very likely to cause grave financial loss to the 
individual. Our analysis describes the social window humankind has to prevent dangerous climate 
change.2 
(i)  Finally, I will also note that there was another important, insightful, largely unacknowledged 
pre-1968 work which clearly details this problem on the public lands of great American West: 
Stewart 1925.  The black and white photographs in this work lend aesthetic, historical, and visual 
weight to the well-crafted argument. 
(j) commons dilemma n.    A type of resource dilemma interpreted as a problem of overgrazing on a 
common pasture, illustrated by the following simple example. Three farmers each own a single cow 
weighing 1,000 kg and have access to a common that can sustain a maximum of three cows without 
deterioration. They all want to increase their wealth by adding a further cow to the common, but 
for each additional cow on the common the weight of every cow decreases by 200 kg. If one farmer 
adds a cow, then that farmer's personal wealth increases from 1,000 kg (one 1,000 kg cow) to 
1,600 kg (two 800 kg cows); if two farmers add a cow each, then the wealth of each increases from 
1,000 kg to 1,200 kg (two 600 kg cows); and if all three add a cow each, then the wealth of each 
decreases from 1,000 kg to 800 kg (two 400 kg cows), and each farmer is poorer than if each had 
acted cooperatively by not adding a further cow to the common. It is always in a farmer's individual 
self-interest to acquire an additional cow, whether or not one or more of the others does so, but if 
they all pursue individual self-interests in this way, then each ends up poorer than if they all 
cooperate, which means that the problem is a social dilemma…  So called because of a reference in 
1833 in an essay on population growth by the English economist William Forster Lloyd ( 1795 –
1852 ) to the ‘tragedy of the commons’—the overgrazing of the commons in 14th-century 
England, which led to the enclosures and the eventual disappearance of many of the commons.3 
(k) Game theory is rarely used to deal with the overuse and misuse of tourism resources. When it 
happens, the issue is normally explained within a non-cooperative setting in which, because of the 
free riding option, a problem emerges as the socially irrational outcome of an individually rational 
behaviour (social dilemma). In some cases, the assumptions upon which this explanation rests risk 
lacking both descriptive accuracy and predictive power. Since tourism is the encounter of a stable 
(residents) with a changing (tourists) population, the paper asserts that, in many cases, the issue may 
be better investigated within a strategic game in which the players do not know an aspect of their 
environment that is important for their choice (Bayesian game). Building on this, the paper 
demonstrates why an unsustainable path may emerge even when both players prefer preservation to 
exploitation and no free ride incentive exists (Bimonte forthcoming, abstract). 
(l) Investment in a common resource shared by all players is difficult to evolve despite higher 
                                                 
1 Ludwig et. al. 1993. 
2  Milinski et. al 2008, abstract ; also see Hauert 2006 
3  Colman 2006 
On the Problem of  Vague Terms:  A Glossary of Clearly Stated Assumptions & Careful, Patient Descriptions        
 
page 45 of 63 
returns because a non-investor (free-rider) always receives more than an investor (altruist). This 
situation is referred to as the Tragedy of the Commons and is often observed in various biological 
systems including environmental problems of human society.1 
(m)  As a final note, despite the assertion of a very confused Director of an Institute of Island 
studies, Hardin 1968 has not been “discredited” by “every biologist.”  In fact, in 2004, in-depth 
citation analysis2 clearly demonstrated that Hardin 1968 is by far the most cited, most influential paper 
in ecology! 
 
Truth 
(a) Knowledge consists in the search for truth – the search for objectively true, explanatory 
theories… 
     It is not the search for certainty.  To err is human.  All human knowledge is fallible and therefore 
uncertain.  It follows that we must distinguish sharply between truth and certainty [italics mine].  That to err 
is human means not only that we must constantly struggle against error, but also that, even when 
we have taken the greatest care, we cannot be completely certain that we have not made a mistake.  
     In science, a mistake we make – an error – consists essentially in our regarding as true a theory 
that is not true…  to combat the mistake, the error, means therefore to search for objective truth 
and to do everything possible to discover and eliminate falsehoods.  This is the task of scientific 
activity.  Hence we can say: our aim as scientists is objective truth; more truth, more interesting 
truth, more intelligible truth.  We cannot reasonably aim at certainty.  Once we realize that human 
knowledge is fallible, we realize also that we can never be completely certain that we have not made a 
mistake.3 
(b) This problem had been seen and solved long before; first, it appears, by Xenophanes, and then 
by Democritus, and by Socrates... The solution lies in the realization that all of us may and often do 
err, singly and collectively, but that this very idea of error and human fallibility involves another 
one-the idea of objective truth: the standard which we may fall short of. Thus the doctrine of 
fallibility should not be regarded as part of a pessimistic epistemology. This doctrine implies that we 
may seek for truth, for objective truth, though more often than not we may miss it by a wide 
margin. And it implies that if we respect truth, we must search for it by persistently searching for 
our errors: by indefatigable rational criticism, and self-criticism.4 
                                                 
1  Wako 2007, abstract 
2  We assessed the degree of influence of selected papers and books in ecological economics using citation analysis. 
We looked at both the internal influence of publications on the field of ecological economics and the external 
influence of those same publications on the broader academic community. We used four lists of papers and books 
for the analysis: (1) 92 papers nominated by the Ecological Economics (EE) Editorial Board; (2) 71 papers that were 
published in EE and that received 15 or more citations in all journals included in the Institute for Scientific 
Information (ISI) Citation Index; (3) 57 papers that had been cited in EE 15 or more times; and (4) 77 monographs 
and edited books that had been cited in EE 15 or more times. In all, we analyzed 251 unique publications. For each 
publication, we counted the total number of ISI citations as well as the total number of citations in EE. We 
calculated the average number of citations per year to each paper since its publication in both the ISI database and in 
EE, along with the percentage of the total ISI citations that were in EE. Ranking the degree of influence of the 
publications can be done in several ways, including using the number of ISI citations, the number of EE citations or 
both. We discuss both the internal and external influence of publications and show how these influences might be 
considered jointly. We display and analyze the results in several ways. By plotting the ISI citations against the EE 
citations, we can identify those papers that are mainly influential in EE with some broader influence, those that are 
mainly influential in the broader literature but have also had influence on EE and other patterns of influence. There 
are both overlaps and interesting lacunae among the four lists that give us a better picture of the real influence of 
publications in ecological economics vs. perceptions of those publications’ importance. By plotting the number of 
citations vs. dates of publication, we can identify those publications that are projected to be most influential 
(Costanza et. al. 2004). 
3  Italics Popper's 1992 p. 4 
4  Popper 1963, p 21 
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UTV  Universal Theory of  Value 
  See Funk 2008a ; Funk 2008c ; Funk 2008d ; Funk 2008f 
 
War 
In one of the greatest speeches of all time – his second inaugural – Abraham Lincoln said: “Both 
parties deprecated war; but one would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other 
would accept war rather than let it perish.  And the war came.” It is a big mistake to say that war is 
irrational.  We take all the ills of the world – wars, strikes, racial discrimination – and dismiss them 
by calling them irrational.  They are not necessarily irrational.  Though it hurts, they may be 
rational.  If war is rational, once we understand that it is, we can at least somehow address the problem. If we 
simply dismiss it as irrational, we can’t address the problem.1 
 
                                                 
1  Italics mine, Aumann 2005, p 351 
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Wasted Time 
Most people...complain about the meanness of nature, because we are born for a brief span of life, 
and because this spell of time that has been given to us rushes by so swiftly and rapidly that with 
very few exceptions life ceases for the rest of us just when we are getting ready for it. Nor is it just 
the man in the street and the unthinking mass of people who groan over this - as they see it - 
universal evil: the same feeling lies behind complaints from even distinguished men. Hence the 
dictum of the greatest of doctors: 'Life is short, art is long.' Hence too the grievance, most 
improper to a wise man, which Aristotle expressed when he was taking nature to task for indulging 
animals with such long existences that they can live through five or ten human lifetimes, while a far 
shorter limit is set for men who are born to a great and extensive destiny. It is not that we have a short 
time to live, but that we waste a lot of it. Life is long enough, and a sufficiently generous amount has been 
given to us for the highest achievements if it were all well invested [italics mine]. But when it is wasted in 
heedless luxury and spent on no good activity, we are forced at last by death’s final constraint to 
realize that it has passed away before we knew it was passing. So it is: we are not given a short life 
but we make it short, and we are not ill-supplied but wasteful of it. Just as when ample and 
princely wealth falls to a bad owner it is squandered in a moment, but wealth however modest, if 
entrusted to a good custodian, increases with use, so our lifetime extends amply if you manage it 
properly. 
     Why do we complain about nature? She has acted kindly: life is long if you know how to use it 
[italics mine]. But one man is gripped by insatiable greed, another by a laborious dedication to 
useless tasks. One man is soaked in wine, another sluggish with idleness. One man is worn out by 
political ambition, which is always at the mercy of the judgment of others. Another through hope of 
profit is driven headlong over all lands and seas by the greed of trading. Some are tormented by a 
passion for army life, always intent on inflicting dangers on others or anxious about danger to 
themselves. Some are worn out by the self-imposed servitude of thankless attendance on the great. 
Many are occupied by either pursuing other people’s money or complaining about their own. Many 
pursue no fixed goal, but are tossed about in ever-changing designs by a fickleness which is shifting, 
inconstant and never satisfied with itself. Some have no aims at all for their life’s course, but death 
takes them unawares as they yawn languidly – so much so that I cannot doubt the truth of that 
oracular remark of the greatest poet: ‘It is a small part of life we really live.’1  
                                                 
1  Sececa c. A.D. 60, pp 1-2 
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